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The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new 
cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms 
appear. 
 




No stable state can arise or endure without a basic social philosophy, 
accepted by the mass of its citizens, more or less consciously pursued in 
public life and private associations, and guaranteed by its laws, whether it 
be the Republica Christiana, or the ideology of the Islamic community, or 
Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité, or „Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of 
Happiness.‟ Nationalism by itself is not such a philosophy. 
 



















 I was a senior in high school on September 11, 2001; I remember clearly my best 
friend Matt Upham intercepting me as a walked from one class to another and telling me, 
without much urgency, that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center in 
Manhattan. I assumed at the time that a small passenger plane had experienced 
mechanical problems and had crashed accidentally into the towers, but was confronted 
with the reality of the situation when I arrived at a classroom with a television set. 
 Americans and indeed much of the international community reacted passionately 
to the events that morning. Yet the horror, the violence, the hatred, and the extraordinary 
bravery of the hours and minutes before, during, and after the initial attacks was largely 
lost to me; I was distracted with my own graduation, applications to colleges and 
universities, and my personal life. 
 The point is this: the events of September 11, 2001, inside and outside the United 
States, did to compel me to study the Middle East. I declared myself a history major 
(concentrating on the Middle East) at Trinity College only in the spring of 2004, and only 
after I had abandoned political science, and public policy and law. I never fully 
understood those who began their studies of the Middle East immediately after 
September 2001; to me, it was a lot like reading the instruction manual for a new 
appliance only after it had broken. 
 Therefore my writing on the Middle East is informed by my love for the Middle 
East, and not some misplaced fear of it or anger towards it. I think all historians 
inevitably develop an adoration, sometimes even a jealousy, for their subject material, 
and are quick to correct or dispel misinformation about it. That is not to say historians are 
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apologists or propagandists – only the worst are, and those are usually, and quickly, 
identified and treated as such. 
 The vast majority of historians are diligent, honest, and eager to earn the respect 
of their audience and their fellow historians. I count myself among them. This thesis, the 
culmination of years of research, writing, and – perhaps more importantly – learning how 
to research, how to write, is my contribution to the collected works of historians, past, 
present, and future, and to the body of scholarship on the Middle East. It is neither 
groundbreaking nor especially controversial, but it is what I believe, based on the sources 
and my own detective skills, happened. More importantly, it is why, how, and when it 
happened. Whether it is the truth is unknown; no history, however influential, however 
celebrated, can ever claim mastery of the truth. In the end, this thesis is as much about me 
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 Something that is most attractive about Middle Eastern countries is that they defy 
comparative studies. Although so many modern Middle Eastern nation-states were once 
counted among territories of the Ottoman Empire and, before that, the early Islamic 
Empire, modern incarnations of Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia are 
entirely unique. It is true that common ideas of Arab nationalism, Islamic revivalism, 
anti-colonialism, and authoritarianism have left their marks on many of these nations, but 
each has experienced them (and often rebuked them) on its own terms. That is not to say 
that any Middle Eastern nation is monolithic, or could possibly summon anything close to 
a consensus vis-à-vis its self-perception or the perception of others. When scholars and 
pundits often speak of Middle Eastern countries they refer merely to those in command of 
government institutions; those largely nameless and faceless people who make up the 
vast majority of citizens are not considered. For much of this paper the actions, and 
reactions, of Iraqi government officials are essential, but the movements, rhetoric, and 
symbolism of opposition parties are equally important, as are the attitudes, allegiances, 
and aspirations of everyday Iraqis. Yet even the term Iraqi is a difficult one in the context 
of the modern Middle East. When did citizens of modern Iraq accept their designation as 
Iraqis? Such a conversation lies outside the scope of this paper; it is more concerned with 
political identities (not national ones) and the relationship of the state to its people. Many 
of these identities stretched beyond national boundaries: Iraqi communists had a 
connection to Soviet Russia, however cosmetic; clerics in the southern shrine cities of 
Iraq had very real connections to their counterparts and patrons in Iran; and Iraqi Kurds, 
many nomadic by tradition, often sought political asylum and refuge in neighboring 
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countries. Thus, while this paper makes no claims to transnational history – its epicenter 
is, in the end, Baghdad – it is informed by its theories. After all, as a region that has only 
recently, within a century, become home to European-style nation states, the Middle East 
represents a perfect candidate for transnational history. The borders of states like 
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq were drawn up by League of Nations mandate rather 
haphazardly and with little respect for the religious, cultural, and linguistic heterogeneity 
of the region. How Iraqis – politically powerful or otherwise – reconciled themselves 
with the new political, social, religious, and cultural situations of modern Iraq is the focus 
of this paper. It follows the birth, and sometimes the death, of opposition movements to 
the status quo in Iraq and the growth of civil society. 
 Despite many (sometimes violent) setbacks, violations of personal liberty, and the 
inescapable fact that for much of the twentieth century the institutions of power in Iraq 
were in the hands of a select few corrupt politicians or military commanders, there is 
convincing evidence that growing in Iraq, especially after the end of World War II, was a 
nascent civil society, a “politics of the street,”
1
 and a group of political opposition parties, 
some more influential than others, that represented almost every major political, ethnic, 
and religious denomination in Iraq. And if the so-called revolution of 1958 was the high 
point of civil participation in Iraqi politics, and of non-governmental sources of political 
authority, then the advent of Ba„thism, briefly in 1963 and permanently in 1968, was its 
low point. Ba„thism, especially in the hands of Saddam Husayn, overtook the Iraqi state 
and Iraqi society to such an extreme degree that political party, national state, and civil 
society became almost indistinguishable, turning traditional sources of anti-government 
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action, the army, opposition parties, religious institutions, either into extensions of 
Ba„thist power or into enemies of the Ba„th party, which meant, in the new dictionary of 
Saddam Husayn, enemies of the state and enemies of the people. In this new political 
world, where state and society were subjugated to political party, opposition groups could 
barely function: the body that had acted as spearhead for revolutionary change (the army) 
had been overrun by Ba„thist officers, the civil bureaucracy had been staffed by a cadre 
of party loyalists, and civil society, or what remained of it, was now represented by Iraqis 
scared away from political action by the threat of torture and death. 
 The purpose of this paper is to walk a narrow line between two historiographical 
conceptualizations of modern Iraq, a deterministic model that imagines Saddam Husayn 
as historically inevitable and an individualist model that blames everything wrong with 
modern Iraq on Husayn. In many ways, the two pictures of Husayn presented by modern 
scholarship represent a larger debate between structure and agency, in other words, were 
opposition parties and civil society organizations long-standing victims of institutional 
weaknesses in modern Iraq, or did Husayn target, and eliminate, these group with never-
before-seen viciousness and tenacity. My argument, and my contribution to scholarship 
on modern Iraq, is that Husayn emerged from a broken political system built on 
patrimonialism, not pluralism, and thus was one in a long line of political despots, but 
that the ideology and violence of his particular political system was new and especially 
dangerous to political, and Party, opposition. 
 Chapter One follows the advent of Ba„thism in modern Iraq, its initial relationship 
with the ruling authorities, and, finally, the ways in which the Iraqi state was transformed, 
under Saddam Husayn, into a police state. Yet the transformation from republican Iraq, 
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with all its institutional weaknesses and democratic imbalances, to the Ba„thist 
interpretation of republican Iraq is not only a story of the emergence of a police state 
based on the threat and use of violence. What exactly Ba„thism and politics meant to 
those in power and those outside of power is equally important. Therefore, Chapter One 
is not simply a history of the Ba„th regime, but also, in the words of Kanan Makiya, an 
“enquiry into its meaning.”
2
 
 Chapter Two recapitulates and analyzes clerical and popular religious opposition 
to the state in modern Iraq, but focuses mainly on the Shi„i party al-Da‘wa, an 
organization and movement that became, after the fall of communism and the rise of 
secular, pan-Arab Ba„thism, the most potent organization capable of defending Islamic 
values and Shi„i civil rights in Iraq. 
 Chapter Three follows the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), which was not merely an 
extension of Soviet communism, but a popular party of Iraqi nationalism. Like al-Da‘wa, 
the ICP was one of the more influential, and more-often targeted, counter-hegemonic 
organizations in post-war Iraq. Its relationship with Ba„thism was particularly 
paradoxical and, eventually, particularly violent. 
 A few definitions are in order. Much of this paper is dedicated to political 
opposition under Ba„thism, but academic definitions of political opposition are hardly 
uniform. Moreover, published interpretations of political opposition are frequently 
limited in scope to a particular region (e.g., Eastern Europe, Western Europe) and a 
particular type of political system. As a result, information relevant to particular countries 
is rarely swept together into a comprehensive framework that speaks definitively about 
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the nature of political opposition.
3
 For the purposes of this paper, political opposition 
represents the politically active, politically disenfranchised organizations that entered into 
a contest, sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent, with the ruling central government. 
The majority of this political opposition took place outside politically-sanctioned arenas, 
since most were monopolized by the Iraqi ruling elite, whether Hashemite, republican, or 
Ba„thist. In this way, my definition of political opposition is different from that of Ghita 
Ionescu, who separates “opposition” – non-institutionalized forms of disagreement – 
from “political opposition” – institutionalized forms of disagreement, i.e., disagreement 
recognized and legitimized by a constitution.
4
 For Ionescu political opposition is the most 
advanced and institutionalized form of political conflict; the term should be used only in 
reference to situations where an opposition is not merely allowed to function, but is 
actually entrusted with a function. In other words, political opposition is an indicator for a 
parliamentary, democratic, or otherwise open and free political society. Its absence 
indicates a dictatorial or monolithic power structure.
5
 Obviously, this conceptualization is 
at odds with my own, which designates organized, programmatic political resistance as 
“political opposition,” regardless of the political society. 
The idea of civil society is also an important component of this paper, indeed an 
important component of all studies of the contemporary Middle East. As far as this paper 
is concerned, civil society is an umbrella term that captures all of the non-governmental, 
non-familial organizations and loyalties in a given society that provide an extra-
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governmental source of political influence and an outlet for the free expression of 
political ideas. This applies, in the Middle East, to religious groups, women‟s 
organizations, business groups, organized labor, etc. An example of Middle Eastern civil 
society is the Kuwaiti diwaniyya, meeting places that have proved politically influential. 
It is commonly understood among politically-active Kuwaitis that no politician could 
hope to win office unless he or she visited most, if not all, of the diwaniyya of his or her 
district.
6
 For most of this paper, civil society organizations overlap with opposition 
parties, but Ba„thism did more than simply crush opposition movements; it absorbed civil 
society to such an extreme degree that extra-governmental politics and associational life 
were all but impossible. 
Another, sometimes unwritten, thread that ties together this paper is nationalism, 
particularly two variants of nationalism that determined many political and social events 
and transformations in twentieth-century Iraq: Iraqi nationalism and Arab nationalism. In 
the simplest terms, Iraqi nationalism represented a distinct Iraqi national identity, the 
primacy of its cultural history and internal political, social, and agricultural realities, and 
downplayed the importance of its Arab and Islamic identity and heritage. Arab 
nationalism, on the contrary, prized Iraq‟s legacy of Arabism – particularly Arab culture, 
Arab history, and Arabic language – and the idea of a unified Arab state. Although both 
ideologies created much of the political friction in the years after the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire, their proponents shared many rhetorical devices, narratives, and goals, 
for example, and particularly during the British Mandate, anti-colonialism. The British 
presence in Iraq was, on one hand, relevant for Iraqi nationalists, in part because it was a 
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problem unique to Iraq and in part because many of the pro-British Iraqi politicians were 
largely pan-Arab; it was, at the very least, advocated by the monarchy.
7
 On the other 
hand, for many who adopted a pan-Arab agenda, Arab nationalism represented an anti-
colonial option whereby all Arab nation-states could rise up together and throw off the 
yolk of European colonialism. 
All of the ideologies discussed throughout this paper are connected in some way 
to ideas of Iraqi or Arab nationalism. Politically, the left-leaning Iraqi organizations, and 
especially the Iraqi Communist Party, pushed enthusiastically for an Iraqi agenda. Those 
in government who supported Arab unity were characterized often by the ICP as 
disingenuous: they pretended to support Arab nationalism to win popular support but in 
reality held their own self-interest above the formation of an Arab nation; they were not 
visionaries, they were a group of elite politicians subordinated to colonial powers. Ideas 
of Iraqi nationalism were especially popular among politically active Shi„is who spent 
much of the twentieth century in the role of a political minority; they distrusted pan-
Arabism in large part because for many of them it represented Sunni domination. 
Pan-Arabism, although at times and in its most radical forms showed hostility 
toward European interventionism, was mostly borrowed from ideas of Arabism that 
predated World War I and tied up in the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. The 
idea of Arab nationalism proved incredibly mercurial, however: in the 1930s, Iraqi 
intellectuals and politicians continued to prize Arabic language and Arab history as focal 
components of Arabism but increasingly imagined Arab nationalism through an imperial 
lens, probably borrowed from European narratives, and looked to resurrect a glorious 
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 Ideas of resurrection and revival were important 
foundations for many groups that espoused pan-Arabism, especially the Ba„th Party. 
Although the Party, by the time Saddam Husayn became president, could have been, and 
was, blamed for sabotaging pan-Arab unity (rivalry with Egypt‟s Nasser, lack of military 
support for the Palestinian independence movement, etc.), it was in its origins a socialist, 
nationalist, anti-colonial movement that called for a common Arab struggle for 





A Note on Historiography 
 Several significant problems confront scholars of modern Iraq, especially scholars 
who study Iraq after the 1958 revolution. Since that critical historical juncture, it has been 
exceptionally difficult for scholars, foreigners and Iraqis alike, to carry out research in 
Iraq. As a result the best-known field studies of modern Iraqi society are based on work 
carried out before 1958.
10
 Many of the works cited in this paper were written by authors 
who could not, or did not, go to Iraq, and thus used as their sources European and 
American archives, newspapers, official Iraqi statistics, etc. Certain types of histories can 
be molded from such sources, but not comprehensive histories and certainly not detailed 
social histories. Most disturbing are a small number of sources that claim objectivity 
(admittedly an impossibility for any historian) but merely reprint the “official” history of 
Iraq according to the Ba„th Party, or the Hashemite monarchs, or the Free Officers. Majid 
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Khadduri is, unfortunately, one of the authors whose reliance on official histories and 
interviews with high-level Ba„thists has negatively affected his later academic work. 
Consider this quotation from Socialist Iraq: “More important perhaps are [Husayn‟s] 
potentials in prudence, flexibility and resourcefulness which quickly come into operation 
whenever he has to make an important decision at a time of crisis. These qualities, 




 Yet many of the books cited in this paper are some of the best written about Iraqi 
history, most notably Hanna Batatu‟s magnum opus The Old Social Classes and the 
Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, without which no serious study of modern Iraq can be 
written. One reviewer called it “a masterpiece of historical literature that singlehandedly 
catapults Iraq from the least known of the major Arab countries to the Arab society of 
which we now have the most thorough political portrait.”
12
 The end result of twenty years 
of research, The Old Social Classes has become hugely influential and led, shortly after 
its release, to a scholarly reexamination of the meaning of the 1958 revolution.
13
 Equally 
important for this paper is Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, written by 
Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, and Republic of Fear, a highly original and 
savage denunciation of Ba„thism in Iraq. Republic of Fear, which figures prominently in 
the chapter on the secret police in Ba„thist Iraq, is far from perfect; it reprints stories and 
rumors
14
 that more disciplined historians might discard as speculative. Yet its 
importance, especially vis-à-vis apologetic (intentional or otherwise) accounts of 
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Ba„thism, should not be understated. Still, in many ways, Republic of Fear, written by 
Kanan Makiya, sits at the opposite end of works that represent Iraqi Ba„thism and 
Saddam Husayn as guarantors of Iraq‟s republican future, and in that respect is similarly 
polemical. Makiya, a secular Shi„i born to an English mother and educated in the United 
States, became after 1989 one of the foremost, perhaps the foremost chronicler of the 
horrors of Iraqi Ba„thism under Husayn, and one of the most vocal proponents for his 
overthrow.
15
 In the build-up to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Makiya became a 
voice of urgency and persuasiveness about American military intervention in Iraq; two 
months before the war started, Makiya visited then-President Bush in the Oval Office and 
said that American soldiers would be greeted by Iraqis with “sweets and flowers.”
16
 
Therefore, Republic of Fear must be, and is in this paper, treated carefully and with the 
recognition that Makiya wrote it with a clear political purpose. 
 Primary sources included in this paper – mostly speeches, internal memoranda, 
and political treatises – explain the evolution of Ba„thist ideology and political power, the 
internal workings of the communist party that for so many years existed underground, 
and the political realities of the Shi„i community in Iraq.  
 
A Note on the Kurds 
The Kurdish population of Iraq, which, according to authoritative estimates, 
equals roughly twenty-three percent of its overall population,
17
 will be mentioned only 
briefly in the following pages; this is neither a deliberate act of omission nor an implicit 
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statement of the Kurds‟ unimportance in the political and social history of modern Iraq, 
but rather because the “Kurdish question” as represented in Middle Eastern scholarship 
and in Iraqi politics was and often is considered sui generis. In other words, although the 
integration or separation of the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq has been one of the more 
important pillars of Iraqi domestic policy throughout the twentieth century, Kurdish 
political opposition was viewed as a political force that could not always easily be 
included in the larger project of nation-building in Iraq. Moreover, Kurdish opposition to 
the central government was often separatist in nature, and thus unlike the political aims of 
Iraqi communists and the leadership and membership of Iraq‟s many religious parties. 
For these reasons, Kurdish political opposition, usually informed by the idea of an 























The Invention of Ba‘thist Iraq 
 
 Iraq on the eve of the second and long-lasting Ba„thist takeover of government 
was, firstly, a comparatively young and inexperienced nation-state, one that was still in 
the process of reconciling itself with modernity, with the foreign policy demands of the 
Middle East and beyond, and with the religious, ethnic, linguistic, and ideological 
heterogeneity of its population; secondly, it was in an embryonic stage of popular 
political participation, of powerful opposition groups, and of civic and social 
organizations removed from the power structure of the state. Yet Ba„thism, or, more 
appropriately, the violent and totalitarian version of Ba„thism practiced by Saddam 
Husayn, dealt a crippling and irreversible blow to civil society and pluralism in Iraq. That 
is not to say that Iraq of the 1950s and 1960s was a political utopia like those dreamt of 
by Immanuel Kant or Thomas Paine; it certainly did not compare favorably to democratic 
systems in Europe, Asia, or in the Middle East. Yet the evidence of nascent civil society 
and pluralism exists: consider the Iraqi Communist Party, which was not simply a 
product of Cold War tensions in the Middle East, but rather a popular party of Iraqi 
nationalism; or the many religious political organizations that argued, explicitly or 
otherwise, for sources of power outside the framework of government. The point of this 
chapter is to explain why and how the Iraqi Ba„th Party changed forever the political 
landscape of Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s, and why, in the end, those sources of political 
authority outside the framework of government – which had previously been capable of 




 Here, it is important to include a brief outline on how political power was 
imagined, institutionalized, and achieved In Iraq before 1958. In many ways Ba„thist 
ideology suffused a pre-existing Iraqi power structure that had been slowly building since 
the beginning of the British mandate. Several important developments are of primary 
interest: the politicization of the officer corps in the Iraqi army (which is elaborated upon 
in a later section), the emergence of Baghdad as the ultimate center of political gravity, 
and the political mobilization of a growing middle and working class who, despite being 
largely excluded from the central government, formed a source of political and 
intellectual power that ran parallel to the state machinery. 
 In the inter-war period, Iraqi society experienced several positive advances: 
extensive rural-to-urban migration (and subsequent challenges to rural culture); 
expansion of print media; new forms of cultural production; and the growth of 
associational life, including professional organizations, student groups, political clubs, 
and labor syndicates.
18
 These developments indicated an embryonic civil society, a 
phenomenon Karl Deutsch called “social mobilization,” something that happens to large 
groups of people in areas that undergo modernization. Social mobilization is a blanket 
term that describes the changes brought on by widespread acceptance of non-traditional 
practices in culture, technology, and economic life: changes of residence, occupation, 
social setting, associates, roles, experiences, and expectations. In other words, social 
mobilization is the need, rooted in modernity, for new images of personal identity and 
new patterns of group loyalty.
19
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 Through the creation and evolution of new organizations (many with political 
tendencies) and the expansion of education and the press, the newly-urbanized middle 
class of Iraq sought to develop new social connections, discover new opportunities for 
cultural and political expression, and create new loyalties that transcended the family, 
clan, or nation. Yet the interwar period was not simply represented by the dynamic spread 
of new associations and civil society organizations; it was represented by an often closed 
political system in which the vast majority of Iraqis were unable to participate in politics. 
In other words, even while political parties and civic organizations expanded, political 
options for everyday middle and lower class Iraqis shrunk. The combination of increased 
political mobilization with a political system based on patronage, nepotism, and elitism 
created a “politics of the street”
20
 whereby politically-conscious Iraqis excluded from the 
central government and its institutions could either divorce themselves from politics 
altogether or criticize the state through media, public protest, strikes, etc.  It is important 
to note that while so many of these politically-aware parties, organizations, clubs, and 
newspapers were unsuccessful in petitioning the government and unable to “fulfill their 
potential for creating a more tolerant and open political system,”
21
 they were allowed to 
exist, to publish, to strike, and to recruit new members. Through a variety of means, these 
organizations were barred from political office and unable to effect legislation, but they 
were, in the end, allowed to survive, often above ground. Such governmental toleration 
cannot be attached to Ba„thism under Saddam Husayn. 
 Throughout the 1930s, 40s, and 50s, new political parties, many with 
programmatic platforms, emerged in Iraq. Three different socialist groups joined together 
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in 1934 to form the Iraqi Communist Party; the Iraqi branch of Hizb al-Ba„th (The Ba„th 
Party) was created in 1952; the National Democratic Party, which advocated social 
democracy and political reform by parliamentary means,
22
  was founded in 1946; the 
Istiqlal (Independence) Party, which favored pan-Arabism, was also licensed in 1946.   
The post-war period in Iraq was one of increasing coerciveness of the regime and 
increasing popularity (although decreasing mobility) for opposition parties.  Whereas in 
the first twenty years of the monarchy (1921-1941), Baghdad was not once placed under 
martial law, between 1941 and 1958 martial law was declared four times, and applied to 
the capital city for a total of 2,843 days – almost eight out of seventeen years.
23
 When the 
three main political parties – National Democrats, Istiqlal, and the Communists – joined 
together in a National Front in May 1954 and won 11 out of 135 seats, Nuri al-Sa„id, the 
major power broker in post-war Iraq, banned all opposition parties and newspapers and 
installed a totally servile parliament. A second national front was formed in early 1957, 
which included the three main parties plus the Ba„th Party, which had approximately 300 
members in Iraq in 1955.
24
 Yet, because the political institutions of Iraq were off limits to 
oppositionist politicians and because the regime had a monopoly on the instruments of 
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The 1958 Revolution 
One of the seminal events in the history of modern Iraq was the 1958 revolution, 
which permanently dissolved the Hashemite monarchy and, by extension, the last 
vestiges of British colonial rule which had been the status quo in Iraq since the end of 
World War I. The Iraqi state had perhaps been walking a path which inevitably led to a 
dramatic shift in political paradigms for, despite intellectual growth and brief periods of 
relatively democratic participation in government in the years after 1941, the central 
authority of Iraq reinforced the same systems of patronage, cooption, and the sometimes 
ruthless use of force that characterized the state during the 1920s and 30s. 
 When, in mid-July 1958, the monarchy was toppled, it was ultimately military 
men who ended the careers and lives of King Faisal and Nuri al-Sa„id, but it was the 
activities of opposition organizations like the National Democratic Party, the 
Independence Party, and the Iraqi Communist Party which gradually eroded the 
legitimacy of the monarchy and Sa„id to a point where the military could take control. 
The constituents of these groups held high expectations for reforms after the 
establishment of a republic, but many of those expectations would be frustrated between 
1958 and 1963, the period during which Iraq was dominated by Prime Minister Abd al-
Karim Qasim. 
 The narrative of the revolution has been hijacked by countless groups in the years 
after the fact, most famously by the Ba„th, who blamed the failure of the revolution on 
Qasim‟s cult of personality and his sabotage of pan-Arab unity, which according to their 
rhetoric was the central reason for the revolution. The question ultimately arises: was the 
1958 revolution a revolution at all or did it more closely resemble the military coups 
17 
 
which dominated the political landscape in Iraq in the mid to late 30s? The question is 
thorny and the answer is somewhat contradictory. The 1958 Revolution was certainly a 
political revolution, one which swept aside a long-standing monarchical system and 
replaced it with a republic; and it was a social revolution, or at least a socially-inspired 
revolution, typified by increased civil and political activity preceding and succeeding the 
revolution. What it was not, however, was an institutional revolution. Qasim, who 
became the face of the Republic in the years after the Revolution, neither institutionalized 
his leadership (like Egypt‟s Nasser) nor did he institutionalize the ideas of the revolution. 
As a result the popular movement that had paved a path for military intervention became 
largely symbolic and Qasim, despite any personal virtues, fell back into a system of 
patronage and autocracy, which the revolution had failed to sweep away. 
 Qasim‟s successors, „Abd al-Salam „Arif and „Abd al-Rahman „Arif, who would 
rule Iraq from 1963-1968, similarly fell into a system of patronage, and kinship and tribal 
affiliations. Unlike Qasim, however, „Abd al-Salam „Arif abandoned all semblance of 
partnership with civil organizations and instead looked to consolidate his power in the 
armed forces and among the economically and religiously conservative sections of 
society. In the first few months following his coup, „Arif dismantled the Ba„th Party, 
which had briefly taken control of Iraq in early 1963, and removed senior military 
Ba„thists from positions of command.
25
 When Ba„thists once again took power in 1968, 
therefore, there was a large political vacuum in Iraq. „Arif‟s reliance on loyal military 
units and wealthy patrons and the disintegration of several opposition parties
26
 allowed 
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the Ba„th to reassemble, make important alliances with disgruntled and disillusioned 
army officers, and stage another coup.  
 
The Ba‘th Party Before the 1968 Coup 
  
Superficially, the Iraqi Ba„th (or Arab Socialist Party) resembled one of its 
greatest political rivals in Iraq, the Communist Party. Featuring strict internal statutes, a 
highly-organized party command structure, and a system of party congresses used to 
amend its constitution (adopted in April 1947) or resolve itself with changing political 
dynamics across the Arab world,
27
 the Ba„th party conducted its internal and external 
political business much like Iraqi communists. Articles five and six of The Constitution 
of the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party read much like the goals of Iraqi communists. 
Article five explains: “…dominion belongs to the people, that they alone are the origin of 
all government and leadership, and that the value of the state derives from the will of the 
masses…” Article six describes the character of the Party: “The Arab Resurrection 
Socialist Party is revolutionary…building socialism cannot be achieved except by 
revolution and strife.”
28
 Yet, despite these apparent similarities, the extent of ideology 
and of structural organization may be overestimated vis-à-vis the process of recruiting 
and retaining members to the Ba„th Party. In fact, kinship and familial loyalty proved 
indispensable to the party affiliation especially before 1968, when Ba„thists took power 
in Iraq. Equally important were common sectarian and geographic origins, which often 
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provided a more permanent sense of group loyalty than ideological or political beliefs;
29
 
many important figures in the government of Saddam Husayn, after all, came from his 
hometown of Tikrit. Yet the nepotism and parochialism of Husayn is only one example: 
Fu‟ad al-Rikabi, the Shi„i founder of Iraqi Ba„thism in the 1950s, saw his organization 
comprised almost completely of Shi„i kinsmen and classmates; and „Ali Salih al-Sa„di, 




 Therefore, to describe the Ba„th Party in Iraq as the organizational and ideological 
equal of Iraqi Communism is something of an exaggeration. Although there existed, on 
the eve of the Ba„thist takeover in 1968, some broad organizational, structural, and 
ideological underpinnings to Ba„thism in general and Iraqi Ba„thism in particular, the 
party (at least its most active members) more closely resembled an interconnected group 
of like-minded kinsmen and friends and not a party whose members were united in their 
devotion to a peculiar ideology or political system.  
 
The Origins of Ba‘thism 
 Although Ba„thism experienced many of its growing pains and ideological 
developments in Iraq, the movement was born in Syria. The Ba„th Party was founded in 
Damascus in 1944 by an unlikely trio, all educated at the Sorbonne in Paris: Michel 
„Aflaq, a Greek Orthodox Christian; Salah al-Din Bitar, a Sunni Muslim; and Zaki al-
Arsuzi, an Alawite. The movement was conceived while Syria was still under the French 
Mandate, and bore all the hallmarks of a national liberation movement. The Ba„th, whose 
                                                          
29





intellectuals called for the end of colonial dominations and complete economic and 
political independence, were similar to other modern, anti-colonial movements in the era 
of decolonization.
31
 After the end of World War II, the Ba„th Party expanded into a mass 
political organization; it rallied against the “political and ideological inadequacies” of the 
older generation of Syrian nationalists and other Arab politicians, regarded as responsible 
for the defeat of the Arab armies in Palestine in 1948.
32
 By 1954 (in part because Arab 
nationalism enjoyed popularity in Syria) sixteen Ba„thists were elected to the Syrian 
parliament. The Party also began to win over adherents in areas outside Syria; branches 
opened in Jordan and Iraq in the early 1950s.
33
 
 The Ba„th Party spread to Iraq beginning in 1949, but only in a very limited way. 
The nascent organization first materialized in Baghdad‟s colleges; its initial members 
were mostly college and secondary school students, many of whom had become 
disillusioned with the Istiqlal Party.
34
 In 1951, Fu‟ad ar-Rikabi took over as chief Ba„th 
organizer and remained in that position for the next eight years. Under ar-Rikabi‟s 
leadership, the Party rose “in number and in quality,” expanding from 50 members in 
1951 to over 100 in 1952 (when it was officially recognized as a branch of the original 
Party in Syria) to 289 members in 1955.
35
 In 1958, Ba„thists supported the overthrow of 
the monarchy and the revolution; al-Rikabi even participated in Qasim‟s first cabinet. 
However, the alliance was short-lived: Ba„thists, disenchanted with Qasim‟s support for 
the ICP (bitter rivals of the Ba„th) and his adherence to Iraqi, rather than pan-Arab, 
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nationalism, led to a failed assassination attempt in 1959. Despite harsh retaliatory 
measures, the Party was able to reassemble and participate in the coup in 1963. For nine 
months the Ba„th maintained a tenuous hold over Iraq until internal divisions led to 
another coup. Reorganized and empowered with the support of key army officers, 
Ba„thists once again seized power in July 1968.
36
 
 It is vital to note that although Ba„thists, once in power, were responsible for 
violence against Iraqi citizens, patrimonialism, and, eventually, the creation of a police 
state, many early members of the Party were caught up in the web of fear, autocracy, and 
violence which characterized the Iraqi political arena before 1968. In June 1955, 22 
members (including ar-Rikabi) of the Party were arrested after protesting against the 
Baghdad Pact; other members were expelled from colleges and schools. It is likely that a 
substantially larger number of members and supporters were detained by the police and 
released for lack of evidence.
37
 Therefore, Ba„thism did not invent political injustice, 
patronage politics, and dictatorship in Iraq – the political discrimination against Ba„thists 
in the 1950s is evidence the Party suffered at the hands of the security police and general 
authoritarianism. Yet opposition politics endured and civil society existed on a significant 





The Shadow State of Saddam Husayn 
The regime of Saddam Husayn lasted longer than any Iraqi administration of the 
twentieth century – this strange statement is emblematic of the paradox that was Iraq 
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under Husayn; it enjoyed unprecedented profits from its oil industry and witnessed the 
expansion of a professional bureaucracy, but was infamous for brutal political repression, 
systematic violence, and belligerence in the inter-state arena of the Middle East. On the 
surface, Husayn‟s Iraq appeared edificial, unified, and militarily formidable; indeed that 
was true of the veneer that obscured the real power of Iraq in the years between 1968 and 
2003. True authority, however, lay in the hands of Saddam Husayn and the small group 
of men he considered either loyal or pliable and therefore worthy of inclusion in his circle 
of leadership. It was this shadow government, hidden beneath the imagery, rhetoric and 
historical narratives of Ba„thist Iraq, which ultimately weakened the Iraqi state, even as it 
strengthened Husayn and his allies. Never before in modern Iraqi history had a leader 
absorbed the identity of the state so thoroughly into his own singular personality, thus 
ensuring that whatever political cohesion existed under his regime would deteriorate 
upon his death or removal from power. 
An indictment of the Iraq of Saddam Husayn is simultaneously an indictment of 
the governmental institutions and policies of the fifty years of Iraqi politics that preceded 
his ascension to power, since the policies of patronage and cooptation that defined Iraq 
from 1920 to 1968 were perpetuated with renewed intensity by Husayn. Manipulated by 
generations of Iraqi statesmen, from regents and kings to the grand practitioner of 
patronage in the 1940s and 50s Nuri al-Sa„id, the institutions of the Iraqi state had over 
the years drawn into the political world Iraqis in position to deliver something of 
importance to their benefactors. Husayn simply revivified a long-standing tradition of 




Iraq during the tenure of Saddam Husayn can be divided between two realms of 
government: operational and institutional. On the operational level, the rise of the Ba„th 
and Saddam Husayn carried with it an expansion in scope of the state bureaucracy, 
bringing the state into the lives of more Iraqis than ever before. The state also reinvested 
the money earned from vast oil revenues in the domestic market and used a portion of the 
funds to create the infrastructure required to support its development projects. In fact, 
until the mid 1980s when the drawn-out war with Iran began to seriously affect the Iraqi 
economy, Iraq had enough money to support both a state welfare system and the 
capitalization of private and public enterprises. Thus, the state provided opportunities for 
economic advancement within the middle class and even among the rural and urban poor 
who had traditionally existed on the margins of society.
39
 
Existing parallel to this operational level and making it possible were the 
institutions of the Iraqi state, which had endured revolutions, coups, and abortive reforms. 
These “engines of power” had long allowed the politicians who inherited them to 
accumulate power and resources, create networks of loyal and useful clients, and 
maintain control over the Iraqi population. Husayn was no different. His state was 
centered on a restrictive circle of close associates who were connected to him through 
familial ties or through shows of loyalty. These men formed the inner circle of the Iraqi 
state while the mass of bureaucrats, businessmen, and officers represented the outer 
circle. In this way, Husayn‟s Iraq was the Iraq of Faisal, Nuri al-Sa„id, Qasim and „Arif: 
an institutionalized system of patronage obscured by a functional bureaucracy.
40
 
                                                          
39
 Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 229-230. 
40
 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 216. 
24 
 
Although Saddam Husayn ruled Iraq through fear and by eliminating political 
opposition inside and outside its borders, it would be unfair to blame all the weaknesses 
of the Iraqi state during his ascension to power solely on his violent and paranoid 
personality. The years between 1959 and 1968 saw several important changes that would 
allow the Ba‟th party to capture power more easily in 1968: the weakening of nationalist 
political parties and labor unions, the marginalization of corporate groups that might 
challenge the power of the central state, and increased sectarianism in political life. The 
totalitarianism and extreme violence of Ba„thism, therefore, did not emerge from a 
political and social vacuum. Husayn and his supporters did not invent what made Iraq 
politically fragile nor did they single-handedly obliterate civil society. In the words of 
Kanan Makiya, Husayn “was an imitator, not an innovator.”
41
 Yet the consistency and 
determination with which Husayn implemented his violent vision of Iraq made him 
politically unique and particularly dangerous to opposition and community politics. 
 From the very beginning of the Ba‟thist state in 1968, it became clear that 
Saddam Husayn wished to distinguish himself from his fellow party members and fellow 
Tikritis. Throughout his rise to power and during his long duration in office, Husayn 
projected an image of the rare, indispensible, and necessary leader, one who was uniquely 
capable of leading his followers and his country to positions of power and privilege; no 
other potential leader could reproduce his unparalleled ability to lead Iraq into the future. 
Consequently, Husayn looked to create in himself a unifying force representative of all 
Iraq around which its citizens could rally. Political unity was expressed not in Baghdad, 
nor a legislative assembly, nor the office of the President; political unity was expressed in 
Saddam Husayn. 
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 Under Husayn‟s leadership, new myths of Iraqi identity and new narratives of 
Iraqi history were disseminated among the population. Chief among these was a 
succession myth, which traced Iraqi hegemony from the ancient kingdoms of 
Mesopotamia, through the Abbasid Caliphate up to Husayn himself, who was the most 
recent in a long line of unbroken political succession.
42
 
 Once Husayn assumed the presidency, he created national institutions to protect 
this national myth and others and to sustain his own personality cult, which portrayed 
him as representative of all the people of Iraq. By the mid-1970s the Ba„th Party had 
become a country-wide organization, efficiently organized and increasingly present in 
every sphere of life. The smallest unit was a party cell (halqa), organized at the 
neighborhood level; the next unit was the division (firqa), consisting of several cells and 




This highly organized Ba‟thist apparatus, which reached citizens in the smallest 
villages and neighborhoods, was one of many instruments used to propagate Husayn‟s 
singular authority. Others included the army, paramilitary organizations like the Popular 
Army and the National Assembly, and the first Iraqi parliament since the dissolution of 
the monarchy in 1958. The Assembly was more or less symbolic; its members had no 
legislative authority. It did have a purpose, however: to create an impression that the 
conduct of the government was being supervised, to provide a symbol of national unity, 
and to give Husayn another forum to present himself as the necessary leader of Iraq.
44
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The above-mentioned organizations were national only because they included 
Iraqi citizens from all regions of the country; in reality they were instruments of 
patronage and reward, whereby Iraqis who demonstrated loyalty to Husayn would be 
repaid with positions of power and financial resources. Those Iraqis bold enough to 
refuse the patron-client
45
 system found it impossible to participate in politics in any 
meaningful way. Subsequently, nearly 500,000 Iraqi professionals and intellectuals left 
Iraq by the mid-1980s.
46
 
In this atmosphere it became increasingly dangerous to practice non-Ba„thist 
politics or criticize the government. The security forces loyal to Husayn were quick to 
clamp down on subversive material and those who disparaged the regime‟s policies. 
Consequently large numbers of Iraqis simply quit politics altogether and limited their 
social interaction to family members and close friends.
47
 
It is important to note that while admission into the political arena depended 
largely on Husayn‟s acceptance, his regime did appoint to symbolically important 
governmental and civic positions citizens of the Iraqi state who were neither Sunni nor 
Arab. This acceptance of non-Sunni Arabs was not due to any type of political pluralism 
but rather to two ulterior motives: 1) Husayn‟s desire to create a base of power 
throughout Iraq that would be dependent on him and therefore protective of his regime 
against adversity and 2) his wish to undermine the legitimacy of traditionally powerful 
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sectarian and regional leaders, replacing them with pliable leaders who could deliver the 




Institutions of Violence 
 All studies of Ba„thism in Iraq invariably suffer from the secrecy that shrouded its 
governmental, military, and police operations, and thus a lack of reliable sources. 
Discussions of the secret police, the most clandestine and paranoid apparatus in Ba„thist 
Iraq, therefore suffer abnormally from this liability, this absence of verifiable data. As a 
result, this section of the paper, which relies significantly on Republic of Fear (which 
already acknowledges its own shortcomings vis-à-vis reliable archival material), is less 
firmly rooted in primary sources. Stories and acts of violence that fill the pages of 
Republic of Fear and that are discussed in this paper may very well be exaggerations or 
even apocryphal, but their mere existence points to a certain reality in Ba„thist Iraq in the 
1970s – a pervasive atmosphere of violence and the threat of violence, of citizens under 
constant surveillance, and of the slow strangulation of community politics. As Kanan 
Makiya writes in Republic of Fear, “sometimes the truth content of a particular story is 
less important than the fact that people have come to believe that it is true.”
49
 
The first chief of Internal State Security after the July 1968 coup was Nadhim 
Kzar, appointed to that position in 1969 by Saddam Husayn. Although many Iraqis 
involved in the security apparatus of Ba„thist Iraq are more or less invisible in the 
sources, many facts are known about Kzar‟s tenure as police chief, mainly due to the fact 
that he was tried and executed in July 1973 along with thirty-five others after a summary 
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Party tribunal. Kzar joined the Party in the 1950s and became one of only a few Shi„is to 
occupy a position of power. He earned a reputation during the first Ba„th regime as 
particularly excessive in his violence and even sadism; these excesses continued into the 
1970s. Under Kzar, the secret police was reinvigorated (it was largely subservient to the 
army between 1958 and 1968) and responsible for a significant number of tortured and 
executed Iraqis, mostly communists and Kurds. Kzar, unsurprisingly, favored a forceful 
resolution to the Kurdish conflict that raged in northern Iraq in the early 1970s; his agents 
attempted to assassinate Kurdish political leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani at least twice 
shortly after the signing of the March 1970 Manifesto, ostensibly an agreement between 
the Kurdish authority and the regime for Kurdish autonomy and peaceful relations.
50
 
          Yet Kzar‟s ambitions were not limited to interrogations and attacks against the 
political rivals of Ba„thism. In early 1973 he took hostage the Minister of the Interior and 
the Minister of Defense and planned the assassination of President Ahmad Hasan al-
Bakr. When the assassination failed, Kzar fled to the Iranian border with his hostages and 
a loyal escort. His convoy, however, was discovered and chased down by helicopter 
gunships. Kzar was captured, then tried and sentenced to death on July 7, 1973. The 
episode was used to justify a widespread purge of Ba„th Party membership.
51
 
 The regime was, understandably, badly disturbed by the attempted coup, but 
matters became worse shortly after the purges that followed Kzar‟s arrest and trial. A 
bizarre series of grisly crimes committed in Baghdad, an area over which the Ba„thists 
claimed complete control, shook the regime. After all, the ruling Ba„thists had boasted of 
lower crime rates and of the efficiency of the emergency police (Shurtat al-Najdah) who 
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were reputed to be able to arrive at a crime scene in Baghdad within minutes. Such 
confidence was shattered during a succession of house robberies where entire families 
were murdered. The perpetrator, nicknamed Abu al-Tubar (the hatchet man), and other 
members of his gang were revealed at his trial to be former members of Kzar‟s police 




 Although stories of Kzar‟s aborted coup attempt and his crony-turned-serial killer 
might seem unrelated to the evolution of a police state in Iraq after 1968, they proved 
incredibly influential not only in the reorganization of the secret police but also in the 
rhetoric of  prominent Ba„thists, most notably Saddam Husayn. At a moment when public 
confidence in the internal state security apparatus was at an all-time low, Husayn 
redefined ideas like “citizen,” “state,” “regime,” and, perhaps most importantly, 
“treason,” and, in the process, justified Ba„thism vis-à-vis the “treasonous” acts of Kzar 
and al-Tubar, during a time when Ba„thism could just have easily been blamed for 
creating such monsters.  
In a speech given on September 24, 1973, at the end of the third session of 
discussions on the Draft Law for the Autonomy of the Iraqi Kurds, Saddam Husayn 
articulated this new, perversely rational, interpretation of crimes against the state, of the 
threat of insidious agents inside and outside Iraq, and of the need to monitor the 
movements of imperialism. 
  
Some people may imagine that the Revolution is unaware of what is 
happening around it. The Revolution has its eyes wide open. Throughout 
all its stages, the Revolution will remain capable of performing its role 
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courageously and precisely without hesitation or panic, once it takes 
action to crush the pockets of the counter-revolution. All that we hear and 
read about, including those crimes which have taken place recently, are 
new devices to confront the Revolution and exhaust it psychologically. 





This speech stands as a perfect example of the paradigm shift that took place under the 
Ba„thists and Saddam Husayn in the 1970s and beyond. Political legitimacy, under the 
rhetoric of Ba„thism, was based on the “Revolution” which was based on “the people.” 
Therefore to offend against the people, as Kzar and al-Tubar had done, was to undermine 
the spirit of the Revolution and, by extension, the regime – a treasonous act. In this new 
upside-down political world, an attack against the people was an attack against the 
government, and an attack against the government was an attack against the people; the 
state (which was quickly swallowed up by the Party) was the people, and thus inviolable. 
Still, Husayn needed to deflect responsibility for Kzar and al-Tubar, who, after all, had 
been state functionaries, while simultaneously justifying the existence of a secret state 
security force. 
 
However, it is not enough to speak loosely about our forces‟ capabilities 
and concepts or about imperialism. We must know, learn, and accurately 
monitor the movements of imperialism. We must calculate with foresight 
the probable development of its plans, forces, and reserves both inside and 




Here the absolute necessity of an internal (and politically motivated) security apparatus in 
Iraq is laid out. This passage, along with the one quoted earlier, warns against 
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“imperialism” and the need for a steadfast agency to “know, learn, and…monitor” it. The 
secret police are the eyes of the Revolution. 
 That Saddam Husayn survived politically the Kzar scandal is something of a 
miracle. Husayn, after all, had been the first head of the Ba„th security services and Kzar 
was his hand-picked replacement and protégé.
55
 Yet Husayn moved quickly in the 
immediate aftermath of the Kzar affair to neutralize his political rivals, reassert order 
among the Ba„th rank-and-file, and reorganize and modernize the secret police. 
 First, Husayn implicated his most popular rival in the Party, „Abd al-Khaliq al-
Samarra‟i, a leading ideologue considered the third most popular person in the Party 
behind President al-Bakr and Husayn. Although al-Samarra‟i was only imprisoned and 
not executed until 1979,
56
 Husayn was successful in marginalizing an important source of 
potential political competition. 
 Second, Husayn acted decisively to rein in any rebellious elements in the party 
militia, many members of which were torn between loyalties to Kzar and to the regime. 
He personally took command of loyal units of the militia and, quite visibly, tracked down 
suspected Kzar loyalists and stormed Kzar strongholds. Most importantly, the army was 
excluded from these proceedings and thus not given an opportunity to insert itself 
politically into the scandal. As a result, the civilian branch of the Ba„th Party was largely 
put back in order.
57
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 Third, and most relevant to this chapter, Husayn restructured the internal security 
apparatus of Iraq. The outcome was three agencies, Amn, Istikhbarat, and Mukhabarat, 
all independently responsible to the RCC. 
 The Amn or State Internal Security, Kzar‟s old department, was reorganized and 
updated based on a secret intelligence agreement between Husayn and Yuri Andropov, 
then head of the KGB. Based on certain clauses of the 1972 Iraqi-Soviet Friendship 
Treaty (negotiated by Husayn), the agreement called for: a reorganization of all aspects of 
internal security on the recommendations of the KGB; supply of sophisticated 
surveillance and interrogation equipment; training for Iraqi personnel in KGB and GRU 
(Military Intelligence) schools in the Soviet Union; exchange of intelligence information; 
and assistance by Iraqi embassy personnel to Soviet agents operating in countries where 
the Soviet Union has no diplomatic relations.
58
 
 The Istikhbarat or Military Intelligence was made responsible for most of the 
operations against Iraqi or other nationals abroad. It frequently employed embassy 
personal, particularly members of the military attaché‟s office. Although it is still difficult 
to assess the scope and successful operations of Istikhbarat, documents leaked in 1979 
revealed an organization committed to intelligence-gathering in foreign capitals, tracking 
the movements of perceived enemies of Iraq outside its territorial boundaries, and 
planning and conducting assassinations against such targets.
59
 
 The Mukhabarat or Party Intelligence was the most powerful and feared agency 
of the three. A “meta-intelligence organization,” Mukhabarat was designed by Husayn to 
watch over the other policing networks and control the activities of state institutions like 
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the army, government departments, and mass organizations such as youth, women, and 
labor. Again, details about this agency are limited, but it appears that membership 
depended greatly on political loyalty and knowledge of the intricacies of the Party, not on 
technical expertise or intelligence-gathering ability.
60
 
 Under Husayn‟s reorganization, reclassification, and modernization of the internal 
(and external) security apparatus in Iraq, the secret police transformed from an unstable 
group of amateur police and interrogators into a professional police force equipped with 
state-of-the-art surveillance equipment, access to advanced interrogation techniques 
borrowed from the KGB, and loyal politically to the Ba„th Party. This loyalty is perhaps 
the most important change achieved by Husayn. Under Kzar, the police force simply 
represented the transfer of the unrestrained brutishness of the first Ba„th coup in 1963 
into the existing security apparatus taken over in 1968. In the years after 1968, when 
technically competent Party members were in short supply, a boss like Kzar had an 
inordinate amount of authority. Under Husayn‟s reorganization, the boss became a 
“faceless party bureaucrat,” one of many in a hierarchy of bosses controlling those below 
and reporting to (and monitoring) those above. Moreover, because all three agencies were 
staffed by Party loyalists, they became essentially political. The result was not only the 
absolute control of the state and its people by the Party, but the absolute consumption of 
the state and its people by the Party. 
The secret police, however, was only one appendage of the state that the Ba„th 
successfully reinvented in the 1970s. The Iraqi army, for much of post-war Iraq an 
important political force in the country, was also a target for reorganization, purges, and 
Ba„thification. 
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Iraq’s Armed Forces 
 For much of the early twentieth century the Iraqi army acted as a tool of internal 
repression; its only real engagement with a foreign military force before the Iran-Iraq 
War took place in May 1941, when it failed to repulse a British force that invaded and 
reoccupied the country. Iraq dispatched military forces to aid the Palestinians in May 
1948, but the army‟s “legacy of internal coercion,” long lines of logistics and 
communications, and a fractured Arab command meant the Iraqi military was for the 
most part inactive during the conflict.
61
 Similarly, Iraq did not have the opportunity to 
participate in an active combat role during the Six Day War in 1967, although it belatedly 
attempted to send forces to the front.
62
  
Throughout the late 1920s and 1930s the Iraqi army officer corps had become 
gradually politicized, resulting in a group of military men willing to forcibly remove from 
office appointed and elected officials of the central government whose decision-making 
and ideology were disconnected from their own. The politicization was the result of 
several developments within the army: expansion and conscription, which created 
generational, ethnic, and sectarian cleavages within the army; a growing symbiotic 
relationship between ideological cliques within the army and the Iraqi intelligentsia; and 
the growth of nationalist sentiment, whether Arab or Iraqi, in the officer corps.
63
 Specific 
events, also, would prove to be instrumental in this politicization: the 1924 military 
agreement signed between the British and Iraq; the Assyrian crisis of 1933; tribal 
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insurrection in the middle and lower Euphrates in the mid-1930s; and, finally, the 1936 
coup d’état by commander of the Iraq army Bakr Sidqi. 
Sidqi‟s successful military coup (and subsequent assassination), however, had not 
ushered in a military dictatorship, but what has been called a “military moderator 
regime,” essentially an “umpire” in the game of Iraqi domestic politics.
64
 The 
assassination of Sidqi, perhaps even more than the 1936 coup d‟état, shifted the center of 
gravity away from the prime minister and his cabinet to the armed forces. Between 1936 
and 1941 a total of five military coups would take place. This era was dominated by 
seven senior army officers, who had conspired to kill Sidqi and claimed responsibility for 
the disintegration of his allies‟ government. Only with their consent could any civilian 
political authority hope to achieve and remain in power between 1936 and 1941.
65
  
 Although the monarchy reasserted its control in 1941 and broke up the armed 
forces,
66
 many of the soldiers who escaped those purges became important players in 
post-1958 politics.
67
 As a result, military men were again able to seize political power 
less than twenty years after the reestablishment of the monarchy that the “Second British 
Occupation”
68
 ushered in 1941. These included General Abd-al Karim Qasim and 
Colonel Abd al-Salam „Arif, who led the military action against the monarchy in 1958 
and who reigned from 1958-1963 and 1963-1966 respectively, and General Ahmad 
Hassan al-Bakr, who ruled Iraq from 1968-1979. 
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 Yet, whereas the officers from 1936 and 1941 were a “moderator regime” that 
prevented the rise of unwelcome governments and replaced one civilian government after 
another, the Free Officers who carried out the 1958 revolution became the government. 
Bakr Sidqi, after all, did not envision for himself a role beyond influencing politics 
behind the scenes; he did not even assume the position of Minister of Defense that was 
offered to him.
69
 The army officers who commanded the institutions of civilian political 
power after 1958 were entirely different; although they pledged themselves to entrust 
authority to civilian hands, leaders of the revolution, specifically Qasim and „Arif, placed 
themselves at the head of the new revolutionary regime. As soon as Qasim had taken 
control, he reorganized the government and filled key positions with army officers. In his 
cabinet only four of fourteen ministerial positions were commanded by army officers, but 
those four were among the most important: Premiership, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of 
Interior, and Ministry of Social Affairs. Qasim initially publicly maintained that his 
cabinet was civilian but soon after his ascension, especially once Salam „Arif was 
marginalized, he began making decisions without consulting his cabinet members.
70
 
 Qasim‟s successor, „Arif, hardly bothered to maintain a façade of civilian 
involvement in his government; instead he focused his energies toward consolidating his 
power in the armed forces and recruiting the economically and religiously conservative 
sections of society. 
 It was in this political environment, where military officers commanded units and 
filled governmental posts, that Ba„thists staged another military coup. What happened to 
the military under Ba„thist rule starting in 1968 was unlike the “moderator regimes” of 
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1936-1941 or the “ruler regimes” of 1958-1968; the army was torn down and rebuilt 
along Party lines and Party loyalties. The conditions that brought army officers into 
politics beginning in the 1930s were removed as was the ideology that allowed them to 
seize power in the 1960s. In short, the army became, under Ba„thism, a creature of the 
Party 
Three developments explain this metamorphosis. First, the regime conducted a 
comprehensive series of purges designed to remove from the army its high-ranking 
officers who might disrupt Party operations or challenge those in power for political 
authority in Iraq. Purges began with officers who had played an important role in the 
overthrow of the „Arif regime but had refused to become Ba„thists (Nayef, Daud, Ansari, 
Uqaili); then officers with Ba‟thist loyalties whose base of power was in the armed forces 
(Hardan al-Tikriti, „Ammash, Naqib, Nasrat); then, finally, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and his 
supporters in 1979.
71
 Any officer whose loyalties were in question, particularly those 
with suspected Nasserist, Syrian, or Communist affiliations, were purged from the 
military and replaced with Ba„thist officers regardless of their military experience. By the 
end of 1970, three thousand Ba„thists were granted military ranks.
72
 Furthermore, a 
network of Ba„th Party organizers was set up in every military unit with several 
responsibilities: propaganda for the objectives of the “revolution and party”; surveillance 
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  Second, the regime instituted a new system of accountability wherein junior 
Ba„thist officers could disobey the orders of their senior non-Ba„thist counterparts if they 
suspected them. Thus a parallel authority developed among the officers corps: party 
members who graduated from the Military College were instructed not to carry out 
important orders without Party approval. As a result, military officers were denied the 
kind of group loyalty that had proved instrumental in its forays into politics in the 1930s 
and 1960s; military identities were subordinated to Party policy.
74
 
  Third, ideology unsympathetic to Ba„thism was separated from the military. 
Comprehensive Party organization within the ranks of the military removed the idea from 
the minds of officers that the army could intervene on behalf of the Iraqi nation when its 
national identity was in jeopardy.  Because the regime and the Party claimed to represent 
the Iraqi nation and its people, and because increasingly the Military Academy was 
restricted to Ba„th Party members, the rationale historically used by army officers to seize 
political power disappeared. The army, because of purges, forced retirements, 
restructuring, and Ba„thist social organization, became another organ of the Party, and 
military coups became a thing of the past.
75
 
 The aim of all these measures was to transform fundamentally the role of the 
army in Iraqi society and avoid the emergence of a military identity capable of 
threatening the hegemony of the Party. Its success is well illustrated by the composition 
of the RCC, the ruling body in Ba„thist Iraq: in 1968 the RCC was composed exclusively 
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In an April 8, 1974 interview with Arab and foreign journalists, Husayn explained 
the status of the army in Ba„thist Iraq. The violence and ugliness of the purges are, 
expectedly, omitted, but the end result is accurately described. 
There is a tank unit a few scores of metres away from this place. An 
unarmed civilian cannot face up to a tank. This unit which is stationed 
here on guard duty might launch an attack against the regime. In such an 
eventuality, all of us unarmed individuals from the President of the 
Republic down to the most junior members of the Party would be unable 
to stand against this weapon. But the weapon is in our hands and other 
weapons are in our hands also, because those who are in charge of these 
arms realise and believe that the people who are entrusted with steering 
the affairs of the country are moving in the right direction, in which they 





What had been a constant danger to civilian governments in the 1930s and the ideology 
and means that had allowed the army to waltz in and out of government in the 1960s was 
gone. The Iraqi armed forces, like the secret police, the Party militia, and the 
bureaucracy, had become so swollen with Ba„thist loyalists that the idea of staging a coup 
became counter-productive. Moreover, the bizarre system of checks and balances that 
interrupted the traditional military chain of command made group loyalties that might 
otherwise have flourished in pre-Ba„thist Iraq impossible. Officers either pledged their 
allegiance to the regime or became candidates for termination or early retirement. 
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 Yet despite the comprehensive reimagining and restructuring of the secret police, 
the army, and other government offices, the Iraq of Saddam Husayn was not merely one 
of innovations. Ba„thism benefitted from the decades-old institutional weaknesses of 
modern Iraq, and from its political legacy of patronage and nepotism.  
 
Conclusion 
That Saddam Husayn survived the eight-year war with its neighbor Iran, which 
had claimed the lives of roughly 250,000 Iraqis and put Iraq over $80 billion in debt, an 
invasion of Kuwait, and the March-April 1991 Intifada is testimony to his own resilience 
and the weakness of the Iraqi state, the institutions of which offered zero possibilities to 
remove Husayn peaceably from office. Indeed, only foreign military intervention in 2003 
ultimately proved capable of toppling Saddam Husayn. 
Husayn‟s Iraq reinforced the institutional weaknesses which had characterized 
every Iraqi regime post-World War I. Although civil society and representational 
government continued in a meager and symbolic way, true power emanated from the 
office and person of the President. Government agencies, bureaucracies and, statewide 
organizations continued to function, but beneath them ran a long chain of patrons and 
clients: the real power brokers of Husayn‟s Iraq. 
When a faction or group did become too ambitious, it was dealt with in one of 
two ways: 1) summarily arrested, tortured, exiled or killed or 2) induced into the 
established system of alliances and patronage. In this way, like his predecessors, Husayn 
controlled the hierarchies of tribal shaykhs and of Kurdish notables, all the while 
persuading them to deliver the loyalty of their tribesmen or soldiers to the necessary 
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leader. The most cooperative tribal and regional leaders were rewarded with land rights, 
promotions, and important resources. 
This system of cooptation was an immovable impediment for those in Iraq 
working to undermine Husayn. These insurgents had to contend not only with the brutal 
violence and oppression of the regime but also the institutions that allowed Husayn to co-
opt large portions of the Iraqi population, thereby destabilizing any real popular support 




















Shi‘i Political Resistance 
 
The focus of this chapter is those Shi„is who became politically active in modern 
Iraq, beginning as early as the end of the eighteenth century. It will look principally at the 
trajectory of political involvement in domestic and international issues on the part of 
Shi„i religious leaders, those mujtahids granted the authority, by way of their training and 
education, to interpret the holy texts of Islam and to guide the community of Muslims. It 
will focus specifically on their role in the formation, mutation, and leadership of Hizb al-
Da‘wa al-Islamiya, a religious-political movement born in the shrine cities of southern 
Iraq in 1958, an association that carried on a legacy of Shi„i political opposition to the 
ruling class in Iraq but that met its most powerful enemy in secular, pan-Arab Ba„thism 
that reigned in Iraq from 1968 to 2003. The years between 1958 and 1980, when the 
spiritual leadership of al-Da‘wa was destroyed and members were forced underground, 
are of principal interest. What will become apparent, hopefully, in the following pages is 
that Shi„is are in many ways politically unique – Shi„is are at least partially politically 
subservient to their religious authorities – and that Iraqi Shi„is are similarly unique: torn 
between political loyalty to the government in Baghdad and the Islamic seminaries in the 
shrine cities and possessing sympathy both to Iraq and neighboring Iran, from which 
many mujtahids claim descent. The trials of modernity, of imperial European 
expansionism, and of Marxism simply complicated the actions of a religious community 
ideologically predisposed to combat secularism. That ideological predisposition, 
combined with lessons learned from militant Islamic groups in Iraq and beyond, and the 
initiative of junior clerics in Najaf, led to the creation of al-Da‘wa, a movement that 
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became, after the fall of communism and the rise of secular, pan-Arab Ba„thism, the most 
potent organization capable of defending Islamic values and Shi„i civil rights in Iraq.  
 
Clerical Political Activism between Iran and Iraq 
 Although the main focus of this chapter will be the years in Iraq during and after 
the 1958 revolution, it is important to comment on clerical activism before the formation 
of al-Da‘wa. That political party did not emerge from a political and religious vacuum 
after all; Shi„i clerics in southern Iraq for much of the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries 
– indeed for much of their existence as a discrete religious community – waged a 
theological battle among themselves between activism and quietism, the belief that 
religious leaders should not involve themselves in politics but rather embrace a distinct 
spiritual authority. Both activism and quietism, alternatively endorsed by religious 
schools and leading grand ayatollahs, had foundations in traditional Shi„i political theory. 
The nineteenth century, however, was one of increasing political activism on the part of 
Iraqi mujtahids. The reasons for this are many, and will be recounted below. 
 The emergence of the mujtahids as a political force in Iraq (and also Iran) in the 
first quarter of the twentieth century was the result of several intellectual, legal, and 
technological factors that find their origins in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The first, legal factor was the revival of the Usuli legal school
79
 and its establishment as 
the authoritative method of Shi„i jurisprudence in the late eighteenth century. With the 
assertion of Usuli legal dominance in Iraq came greater clarity regarding the juristic role 
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of mujtahids along with several important theological rulings; the Usuli School, for 
example, forbade the imitation of deceased authorities, granting more power and 
authority to living, breathing mujtahids.
80
  
The Usuli victory over their principal rivals the Akhbaris greatly enhanced the 
legal reach of Shi„i mujtahids,
81
 but also had importance economic implications: it 
provided a legal justification for the diversion of money from laypeople to the clerical 
class. Where the Akhbaris had discredited the claims of mujtahids to the khums (religious 
taxes), the Usuli School maintained that mujtahids, as representatives of the hidden 
imam, could perform duties normally reserved for him, including the collection of half of 
the khums. This arrangement was represented famously by Najafi mujtahid Shaykh Ja„far 
Kashif al-Ghita who, during his visits to Iran, collected khums and was said to consider 
anyone who withheld taxes an enemy of the imam and his representatives. Al-Ghita 
would later donate the imam‟s share of the khums to the Shah of Iran for the entire 
duration of the Perso-Russian War (1810-1813), a very early example of the 
politicization of the religious scholars of southern Iraq.
82
 
The growing political activism in Shi„i Islam was also a product of the ideas 
introduced by modernist Islamic thinkers of the nineteenth century. The ideas of Jamal al-
Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), Muhammad „Abduh (d. 1905), and Muhammad Rashid Rida 
(d. 1935), among others, were gradually transmitted to the shrine cities and developed a 
life of their own among the students and ‘ulama of the seminaries of southern Iraq. These 
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ideas included, but were not limited to: ideas of patriotism to one‟s country (watan) as 
distinct from a believer‟s responsibility toward the umma (Islamic community); the 
importance of intra-Muslim unity in the face of European expansionism and imperialism; 
and the urgent need to revivify Islam and reconcile it with modernity.
83
 Ideas of Muslim 
unity above all else, mainly posited by al-Afghani,
84
 surely must have influenced the 
clerical class in Najaf in the events that constitute the 1920 revolt, during which Sunnis 
and Shi„is collaborated in unprecedented ways to prevent Iraq from being controlled by 
British forces.  
Technological advances, specifically the introduction of the telegraph in Iraq and 
Iran in the 1860s, also led directly to a greater concentration of power and influence in 
the hands of a few leading Iraqi mujtahids. Telegraph communications between 
mujtahids in Iraq and their constituents in Iran had two important ramifications: 1) 
frequent contact between the parties increased the authoritative status of the mujtahids 
and 2) financial backers in Iran started to push the Shi„i scholars in the shrine cities to 
engage more in worldly affairs. Soon after, Iraqi mujtahids became more and more 
politically involved in Iranian domestic and international affairs. 
There was also a geopolitical component to the combination of religious authority 
and political maneuvering in the shrine cities of southern Iraq. Unlike the clerical class in 
Iran, which enjoyed a privileged relationship with the state, Iraqi mujtahids were not 
integrated into a formal governmental hierarchy. In Iraq, in the absence of effective state 
control, the mujtahids more or less regulated themselves; they behaved like “free 
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electrons” competing for resources, influence, and sometimes political power.
85
 This 
geographic distance from Iranian sovereigns, along with the emergence of Najaf as an 
“extra-territorial pole of Shia religious authority,” and the lack of any meaningful state 
control by Ottoman sovereigns meant that the relationship between Iraqi mujtahids and 
the Qajar dynasty, for much of the nineteenth century marked by quietism and 
cooperation,
86
 would become much more confrontational.
87
  
Although the ‘ulama of the shrine cities were principally involved in Iranian 
worldly affairs up to the First World War, they participated actively in various political 
episodes leading up to the formation of the modern Iraqi nation-state. Although Shi„i 
scholars had been anxious to keep the Ottomans at a safe distance, they decided to side 
with the empire following the landing of British troops in Iraq in 1914, preferring 
coexistence with a Sunni overlord than face the prospect of foreign and un-Islamic 
occupation. They issued fatwas (religious edicts) urging the local population to join the 
Ottoman army and even led tribal militias into battle against British armed force, dealing 
heavy losses to British troops. These events recall the ideas introduced by Islamic 
modernists in the nineteenth century, namely the necessity of united action against the 
West. Although Shi„i clerics considered Ottoman rulers mughtasibun (usurpers) they 
urged their followers to wage war against the British under the Ottoman flag.
88
 
After the fall and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and the creation of 
modern Iraq from three former Ottoman provinces, the ‘ulama petitioned the League of 
Nations and demanded the creation of an independent Iraq governed according to Islamic 
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law and the rulings of the mujtahids. When the British occupation of Iraq was officially 




Although the events and trends recounted above are several decades removed 
from the formation of al-Da‘wa, the legacy of clerical involvement in domestic and 
international politics that began in the nineteenth century as a result of new, modernist 
political theory, technological breakthroughs, and the initiative of individual mujtahids 
gave junior clerics in the late 1950s an intellectual and theological foundation from which 
to launch a never-before-seen political movement. Yet, as important as internal factors 
were to the politicization of the mujtahids, external factors, especially European 
expansion into the Middle East, radicalized Iraqi scholars to a certain degree. The British 
mandate, the new Iraqi monarchy, and the advent of minority Sunni rule in modern Iraq 
similarly radicalized the clerical class. Obvious political inequality, economic starvation, 
and the growth of ideologies inimical to Islam in twentieth-century Iraq would all prove 
to be significant prerequisites for the formation of al-Da‘wa. Most, if not all, of those 
trends can be traced back to the failure of the 1920 Revolt, an event with serious 
ramifications for Shi„i political consciousness and mobility in modern Iraq and for the 
long-term viability of the hawza, the traditional center of Islamic learning in southern 
Iraq. 
 
Political Conflict and Cooperation between Iraqi Sunnis and Shi‘is 
The revolt that occurred in 1920 is still something of a mystery to students of the 
modern Middle East and specifically to students of modern Iraq. The nature of the revolt, 
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the tribes, political blocs, and cities that took part in the revolt, the motivations of those 
groups, and the extent of Sunni-Shi„i collaboration are only some of the historical 
questions historians continue to contemplate. Answers to these questions exist in a 
variety of interpretations composed by Shi„i writers of different backgrounds and 
loyalties about the nature and origins of the revolt.
90
 Many Shi„is who participated in the 
revolt and who later held ministerial positions under the monarchy emphasized the 
national dimension of the revolt and the leading role of cities, particularly Karbala, Najaf, 
and, to a lesser extent, Baghdad; Shi„i communists portrayed the revolt, in their accounts, 
as an example of Iraqi masses standing up bravely to foreign imperialism; and religious 
leaders highlighted the importance of mujtahids in organizing, leading, and providing the 
ideological underpinnings to the revolt.
91
 It remains difficult to say whether the revolt 
represented the precedence of religious sentiment over nationalist aspiration  (or vice-
versa) or simply self-determination versus imperialism (most likely all these factors and 
more inspired Iraqis of very different ideological inclinations to raise arms against the 
British), but what seems clear among all the conflicting narratives is that the Shi„i ‘ulama 
played a decisive role, indirect or otherwise, in inciting the tribes to revolt against British 
rule in Iraq. In fact, even those shaykhs that would become large landowners under the 
monarchy after the failure of the revolt, those who provided a “shaikhly anchor” for 
British policy during the mandate, participated in the events of 1920 in large part because 
of the relationship between their tribesmen and the Shi„i ‘ulama of Najaf and Karbala. 
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The powerful influence the clerical class exercised over the “rank-and-file” tribesmen of 
the middle and lower Euphrates made it difficult for tribal chiefs of those areas, 
regardless of their loyalties and status, to disobey calls to arms from the shrine cities.
92
 
In any event, the revolt was, from the indigenous Iraqi point of view, a failure – 
British forces in October 1920 regained control over the central and lower Euphrates and 
defeated the tribesmen fighting there. As mentioned above, Shi„is experienced a 
particularly devastating blow; despite their numerical superiority they were denied 
important positions in the new government and in the growing bureaucracy and civil 
service. The authority and freedom of movement of Shi„i mujtahids was perhaps 
damaged even more, in large part because subsequent generations of Sunni rulers in Iraq 
were able to 1) successfully achieve a separation between religion and state in Iraq and 2) 
limit the spread of Shi„ism in the country.
93
 By separating religion and state, the Sunni 
rulers of Iraq, during and after the monarchy, were able to invest political authority in 
Baghdad and the expense of the southern shrine cities. By limiting Shi„i conversion in 
Iraq, they were able to shrink the size of the mujtahids‟ constituency. Members of the 
monarchy and of successive Sunni cabinets were also successful in splitting the mujtahids 
from their most important military and economic assets: Shi„i tribal shaykhs. Where 
mujtahids were disenfranchised, exiled, and systematically stripped of political power, 
Shi„i shaykhs were offered political and economic incentives, transforming them into 
political players who benefited from the status quo.
94
 
The failure of the 1920 revolt forever altered the political landscape of the modern 
Iraqi nation-state. Where Shi„is had been Ottoman subjects before the end of World War 
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I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, they became, during the first decade of the 
Iraqi monarchy, more or less removed from the institutions of power in Iraq, 
disenfranchised in favor of Sunni Arabs and their British benefactors. Even during the 
1930s, when Shi„is began to push a particular agenda through parliament, and the 1940s, 
when more and more young, educated Shi„is began to compete with Sunnis for 
government and bureaucratic positions, the balance of power shifted obviously and 
seemingly irreparably in favor of the Sunni population of Iraq. There were brief moments 
of intra-Muslim cooperation, most famously in 1920 and to some extent in 1935, but 
these were exceptions to the rule of Sunni Arab political dominance. In addition to the 
growing political imbalance between Shi„is and Sunnis was a widening gulf between lay 
Shi„is and mujtahids. After the failure of the 1920 revolt, several Shi„i clerics were exiled 
or chose voluntarily to relocate to Iran, where they were unable to alter to course of Iraqi 
domestic politics. Those who stayed in Iraq were systematically marginalized from the 
political process.
95
 Without any significant political or religious leadership from the 
shrine cities in southern Iraq after the revolt, many Shi„is attempted to reconcile their 
lives with the political realities of modern Iraq, turning first to constitutional means and 
non-violent protest, then to violent rebellion, and finally to radical options like 
communism and, eventually, political Islam.  
Political opposition of all kinds emerged more obviously and more organized in 
the years between the beginning of World War II and the 1958 Revolution. A new 
generation, more politically-minded and better equipped to oppose the institutionalized 
power structure of Iraq entered public life, and in the process dramatically expanded the 
public sphere. Communists were especially successful in creating an “illegal public 
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sphere” and in their counter-hegemonic struggle against the state.
96
 The Shi„i critique 
against the Sunni rulers of Iraq also changed in these years of widespread social unrest 
and sometimes violent opposition: it not only decried the misrepresentation of Shi„is in 
government and in the civil service, but also opposed the government‟s social policies 
and its foreign policy decisions.
97
 These trends acted largely as a prelude to 1958, set the 
stage for communist control (however brief), the first rumblings of organized Islamic 
resistance, and finally the emergence of al-Da‘wa as an oppositionist group. 
 
Reactions to Marxism, Secularism, and the Decline of the Hawza 
 
The exact date of the formation of Hizb al-Da‘wa al-Islamiya (the Islamic Call 
Party) is still a subject of debate. Most place the date sometime in 1957 or 1958, but 
others, including Vali Nasr, argue al-Da‘wa was founded in 1967.
98
 The vast majority of 
evidence, however, points to the inescapable fact that the formation of al-Da‘wa was a 
direct response to the changes the 1958 revolution represented and effected in Iraq. 
The revolution had far-reaching economic, political, and religious implications for 
all of Iraq, but the traditional Shi„i religious establishment in southern Iraq experienced 
the revolution and its aftermath in a uniquely negative way, in no small part due to the 
popularity and political power of Marxism in Iraq during and immediately after the 
revolution. Although Marxism had been steadily growing as an alternative ideology in 
Iraq for twenty years, the 1958 revolution and the months that followed represented the 
height of popular interest in and political power of the Iraqi Communist Party, founded in 
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1934. The formation of al-Da‘wa represented a reaction to the rise of communism 
(indeed all secular ideologies) in Iraq and the corresponding lack of interest in 
conservative Islamic ideology. Marxism spoke to the poorer and newly urbanized 
segments of Shi„i society but also to the young clerical class; many sons of mujtahid left 




For the clerical class in southern Iraq, communism represented a social, religious, 
political, and economic challenge to Islam, both as a faith and a legal authority. The 
extent of popular participation in communist-led political life was unprecedented during 
and after the revolution and profoundly affected the popularity and political power of the 
clerics. For example, the pilgrimage to the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf in 1959, 
immediately following the revolution, registered its lowest numbers ever; only a few 
hundred pilgrims visited the shrine cities that year, where tens of thousands had visited in 
previous years.
100
 There was also a sense among the ‘ulama that the religious sense of 
their constituents was weakening. In 1918, approximately 6,000 students attended the 
theological schools in Najaf; by 1957 that number had declined to 1, 953, only 326 of 
whom were Iraqis. For many clerics, the old faith was receding, and being replaced with 
skepticism and sometimes disdain for traditional Shi„i rites.
101
 
The growing lay interest in communist-led politics and subsequent lack of interest 
in all things Islamic represented not only a spiritual and political defeat for the Shi„i 
clerics in the shrine cities in southern Iraq; the popularity of secular ideologies had 
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important economic implications for the clerical class. Because the religious institutions 
of southern Iraq relied in large part on voluntary donations from religious believers, the 
increasing disinterest in Islam meant less material resources.
102
 Laws passed by the new 
regime in Baghdad similarly damaged the economic and political standing of clerics and 
their closest lay allies: the merchants in the shrine cities and tribal shaykhs. Merchants in 
Najaf, Karbala, and elsewhere whose revenues were tied to the uninterrupted flow of 
pilgrims in southern Iraq were, on one hand, dealt a severe financial blow by the rise of 
secularism and the popularity of Marxism. The dissolution of parliament and the upper 
house, on the other hand, meant a loss of esteem for tribal shaykhs (many of them Shi„i), 
traditionally allies of the clerics. Agrarian reforms and the abolition of the Tribal Dispute 
Act similarly destroyed the power, wealth, and legal authority of tribal shaykhs in the 
countryside.
103
 Suddenly the clerics had lost a social class that had been one of their 
largest political and economic
104
 supporters. 
Actions taken by the Qasim regime also dealt powerful blows to the social and 
religious authority of the clerical class in Najaf and beyond. The family law reform, 
which suggested equal rights for women, the imposition of monogamy, and the regulation 




The changes effected by Qasim and his political associates once in power were in 
many ways the culmination of several trends in Iraq during the majority of the twentieth 
century: the declining status of the ‘ulama in Najaf and beyond, diminishing attendance 
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in theological seminaries, decreasing revenue in the form of khums (religious taxes), and 
general socioeconomic setbacks in the shrine cities.
106
 How the clerical class and their 
mercantile allies in southern Iraq responded to these political, religious, economic, and 
social challenges is the subject of this chapter.  
The first response was launched by what became the Society of ‘Ulama in Najaf, 
composed of the older generation of conservative Shi„i clerics. The movement was 
focused primarily on education and philanthropy; it supported revivifying and extending 
madrasas (religious schools), expanding social services, and disseminating publications 
that attacked atheism and supported conservative Islam. The second, and by far the more 
politically-motivated response came from reform-minded junior clerics and lay activists 
from Shi„i mercantile families. It supported a universal Islamic ideology to replace 
Marxism and a modern political apparatus to make it happen. This is the origin of Hizb 
al-Da‘wa al-Islamiya, a movement that, from its beginning, faced significant opposition 
from middle and working-class secularism across Iraq and from apolitical conservatism 
in the seminaries of southern Iraq. 
It is important, here, to distinguish al-Da‘wa from other Islamist organizations of 
the modern Middle East; it was not, for example, simply an Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood. 
Although al-Da‘wa eventually borrowed many of the methods and structures of Egypt‟s 
Muslim Brotherhood, its origins in the religious schools in Najaf and other shrine cities 
bestowed upon it an allegiance to senior clerics and traditional Islamic law even as it was 
politically active; in other words, al-Da‘wa was in its embryonic stage the political 
expression of the hawza, the seminary of traditional Shi„i Islamic studies in Iraq, whereas 
the Muslim Brotherhood became the social and political expression of the young, 





educated, religiously-conservative middle and lower-middle classes in Egypt.  This is 
easily the largest difference between the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Da‘wa which 
otherwise share many methods, ideologies, and rhetorical devices: the former was created 
by devout laymen who fiercely criticized the religious establishment; the latter was 
composed by junior clerics intimately involved with the Shi„i religious establishment in 
southern Iraq. 
That is not to say that the first organizers of al-Da‘wa simply reiterated and 
reinforced traditional Shi„i religious doctrines; al-Da‘wa adopted a distinctly reformist 
and modernist stance vis-à-vis the religious establishment. The statutes of the party, 
written by Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr, who quickly became the face of al-Da‘wa, 
contained innovations which many of the senior clerics in Najaf considered deviations 
from Islamic doctrine. One of the most controversial ideas introduced by al-Sadr was the 
concept of dual authority: members of al-Da‘wa owed allegiance to both the leadership 
of the organization and to the Grand Ayatollahs in Najaf; he proposed the idea of wilayet 
al-umma, whereby God transferred worldly power from the prophets to the community of 
people.
107
 Another sign of the modernism of al-Da‘wa was its communications with the 
Sunni Islamist movements in Iraq, including the Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The Brotherhood was specifically mentioned in al-Sadr‟s statutes as an organization to 
emulate and surpass; the works of Hasan al-Banna were included in the indoctrination 
program for new members.
108
 
This somewhat paradoxical situation – in which al-Da‘wa refused to emulate the 
ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood but borrowed many of its organizational features – 
                                                          
107
 Nicolas Pelham, A New Muslim Order: The Shia and the Middle East Sectarian Crisis (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2008), 15. 
108
 Louër, Shia Politics, 85. 
56 
 
speaks loudly about its ability both to survive (partially underground) among oppressive 
governments and it ability to recruit successfully among disgruntled Iraqis frustrated with 
the political and religious situation in Iraq during the 1960s and 1970s. It also 
demonstrates the uniqueness of al-Da‘wa, an organization bound by Islamic law and 
patterns of authority but committed also, to varying degrees during its political evolution, 
to revolutionary change. 
 Although al-Da‘wa owed its existence to junior Shi„i clerics who sought to 
defend and revivify Islam against the rising tide of secular ideologies in Iraq, the 1960s 
saw many scholars abdicate their leadership positions within the movement in order to 
dedicate themselves to their religious careers. More and more, the core membership of al-
Da‘wa was drawn from young, educated laymen. Over 1,500 copies of the official al-
Da‘wa journal, the Sawt al-Da’wa, were distributed to supporters in the University of 
Baghdad alone.
109
 This trend away from clerical authority and toward lay control was 
explained and exacerbated by the political climate in Iraq in the 1960s. In 1963 the 
regime of „Abd al-Salam „Arif undertook a brutal suppression of the secular 
organizations which had attracted many young, educated Shi„is: the Communist Party 
and the Ba„th Party. The regime of „Arif was intensely sectarian, relying on the Sunni-
dominated army and powerful Sunni landowning clans, and excluding political minorities 
like the Shi„is. This trend was to be continued by Saddam Husayn and the Ba„th party 
who came to power in 1968. Suddenly, al-Da‘wa became the most potent political 
organization capable of defending Shi„i interests in Baghdad and beyond.
110
 Its ideology 
rallied not only against secularism but also the institutionalized power structure of 
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 Through the 1960s, the membership of al-Da‘wa attempted to revive Islam 
through print media; al-Da‘wa published books and booklets explaining Islam‟s answer 
to issues relevant to the working classes of Iraq, including the rights or workers and the 
redistribution of wealth. Propaganda was often supplemented with public works projects, 
including religious schools and charitable associations.
112
 Most, if not all, of these 
writings and social welfare projects were addressed and provided to Iraqi Muslims in 
general and not specifically to Shi„is; unlike the Society of Scholars, organized by senior 
clerics in 1960, al-Da‘wa was aimed at a much wider constituency.
113
 As a result, al-
Da‘wa was particularly effective in targeting young lay people, who the movement saw 
as the driver of societal change, and working class Shi„is from the impoverished eastern 
Baghdad area. There was also an effort to recruit female members; this mission was 




 Apart from print media, the founding members of al-Da‘wa engaged in a series of 
lectures and conferences in Najaf and eastern Baghdad ostensibly for religious purposes 
but in reality a means to recruit pious, young laymen to their cause. Potential recruits 
were introduced to the movement by “callers,” al-Da‘wa members who would enlist 
family members, classmates, and fellow soldiers.
115
 Callers gave potential recruits 
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religious literature and, perhaps more importantly, a sense of self-respect; as practicing 
Muslims, recruits and their families were highly esteemed.
116
 
 The efforts to expand al-Da‘wa within and eventually outside of Najaf were 
assigned to several important disciples. Abd al-Sahib Dakhil was responsible for 
spreading the religious message of al-Da‘wa in Iraqi universities; Shaykh Arif al-Basri 
was responsible for the spiritual guidance of Baghdad‟s newest members; al-Sadr‟s sister 
Bint al-Huda, a respected ‘alima (female religious scholar), was, as mentioned above, 
responsible for recruiting pious women into the movement; Sayyid Mahdi al-Hakim 




 Although the founding members of al-Da‘wa, during the 1960s, made slow 
progress among young, educated, and working-class Iraqis, their fledgling political 
movement faced significant opposition from secularists and clerical traditionalists. The 
first, secular challenge came from Qasim‟s supporters and from communists who 
dismissed the members of al-Da‘wa as reactionaries. By 1959, communists had made 
themselves indispensable to President Qasim, a former army officer with little popular 
support before the revolution, and subsequently extended their power and influence 
across Iraq. During Qasim‟s reign, communists had enough freedom of movement to 
spread propaganda via Iraqi print media and radio, create a presence in student groups, 
and directly or indirectly control important segments of several governmental ministries. 
The ICP could mobilize members and supporters at short notice, also, filling the streets 
with a significant visual reminder of their prestige, and partially control access to 
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 From this position of power communists could attack al-Da‘wa and its 
perceived Islamic militancy as a regression. Many communist leaders, in more 
conciliatory overtures, mobilized sympathetic „ulama to stress the compatibility of Islam 
and socialism; they also, via communist newspapers, attacked “hostility to the republic 
under the cloak of religion,” but cautiously refrained from attacking Islam by name.
119
 
 The second, religious challenge came from the conservative religious 
establishment in southern Iraq, namely senior ‘ulama from Najaf and those from Karbala, 
led by Hassan Shirazi. Many senior clerics objected to al-Da‘wa on philosophical and 
practical grounds. A large number of traditionalist, conservative Shi„i ‘ulama embraced 
quietism and thus argued against al-Da‘wa based on Shi„i doctrine: the call for 
establishing an Islamic state contradicts the Shari‘a, which demands quietism until the 
return of the Hidden Imam. Al-Da‘wa members‟ focus on Islamic utopianism and a 
mundane political party to achieve that goal was therefore anathema to the traditionalist 
camp. Practically, senior ‘ulama feared that al-Da‘wa would represent a source of 




Shirazi, based in Karbala, issued a different kind of doctrinal argument: militancy 
is allowed by the Shari‘a, but must be endorsed by a fatwa (religious edict) and led by a 
supreme mujtahid who enjoys wilaya ‘amma (general command). The Karbala group 
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The above doctrinal and theological arguments were often combined with 
concentrated attacks against prominent members of al-Da‘wa. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr 
was, more often than not, the main target. He was accused of Sunni heresies and his 
treatise of fiqh was derided as “superficial” and “shallow.”
122
 This latter criticism was 
perhaps the most devastating for a junior jurisprudent who was endeavoring to create a 
universal Islamic ideology to replace communism. 
 
Al-Sadr and his Philosophy 
Despite heavy criticism leveled against him from clerical conservatives, al-Sadr 
was successful in defining and outlining the meaning, purpose, and doctrinal status of al-
Da‘wa in its formative years (1960-1964). He was responsible in 1960 for writing al-
Usus (the Foundations or Fundamentals), the intellectual framework of al-Da‘wa that 
was later approved by the founding members. In many ways al-Usus was al-Sadr‟s 
answer to The Communist Manifesto; it outlined, among other things, 1) the 
establishment of a modern organization to broadcast the party‟s ideology and effect its 
mission, 2) a categorization of stages of activity leading to the fulfillment of its goals, and 
3) the concept of the Islamic state as the ultimate goal of al-Da‘wa.
123
  
Besides writing the founding manifesto of al-Da‘wa, al-Sadr distinguished 
himself as the author of important treatises on contemporary Islamic thought, including 
Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy) in 1959, in which he deconstructed Marxist theory, and 
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Iqtisaduna (Our Economics) in 1961, in which he explained his idea of Islamic theory of 
political economy. By publishing these books, along with later religious and political 
treatises, al-Sadr prompted a debate within scholarly and lay circles about the resilience 
of Islam, the independence of Islamic theory, and its place among the myriad challenges 
of the modern world. In his models, Islam was a third way of government, beyond 
capitalism and socialism.
124
 It is important to note that al-Sadr reserved most of his 
criticism in Our Philosophy and Our Economics for Marxism, particularly “dialectical 
materialism.” Al-Sadr writes in Our Philosophy: “Reflect on how nonsensical the idea of 
motion is in dialectical materialism!”
125
 
Our Economy is even more critical of Marxism and of capitalism, which al-Sadr 
saw more as a matter of doctrine than of scientific laws. For him, the differences among 
the three economic models – Marxism, capitalism, and Islam – rested fundamentally on 
the nature of the economic problem proposed by each. For capitalism, the problem was 
scarcity of resources; for Marxism, the form of production and distribution; for Islam, the 
problem was the wants of man.
126
 In other words, in the economic sphere the Islamic 
model would closely relate incomes to effort and need. It would also, along similar 
reasoning, prohibit any gain from usury or hoarding, reestablish money as a means of 
exchange, transform banks from capitalist institutions into tools for enriching the 
community, narrow differences in standards of living, etc.
127
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The Islamic economy as conceptualized by al-Sadr was composed of three basic 
components: the principle of multi-faceted ownership; the principle of economic freedom 
within a defined limit; and the principle of social justice.
128
 By embracing multi-faceted 
ownership, Islamic economy distinguished itself from capitalist society, with its emphasis 
on private ownership, and socialist society, with its emphasis on common ownership. 
Moreover, the Islamic economy again walked a line between the morally bankrupt 
systems of capitalism and socialism when al-Sadr suggested “individuals…practice their 
freedom within the limit of values and ideals which will train and burnish that freedom 
and make it into a better tool for the whole of mankind.
129
 Using this line of 
argumentation, al-Sadr imagined an alternative economic, and, by extension, political and 
moral, system that would serve as a foundational principle for an egalitarian Islamic 
society in Iraq and beyond. What emerges from all of al-Sadr‟s writings is an image of a 
balanced, socially just, egalitarian, and equitable society, based on the social victories of 
the earliest community of Muslims and opposed to the economic principles of capitalism 
and socialism, both of which existed in one form or another in a Middle East caught 
between two Cold War superpowers. Yet al-Sadr‟s work was not simply a reaction to 
international economic and political trajectories; much of it was composed in reaction to 
what al-Sadr regarded as an un-Islamic and unequal political situation in Iraq. 
Communism and Marxism, depicted as atheistic and materialistic, were significant rivals 
to al-Sadr‟s Islamic system, but so too were successive military regimes and despotic 
governments whose source of power was neither popular support nor egalitarian 
freedoms, but networks of co-opted clients and the armed forces. The Ba„th regime, 
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which proved particularly violent toward religious institutions and ordinary Shi„is, 
emerged as a truly dangerous enemy, not only to the philosophical notions posed by al-
Sadr but also to the physical wellbeing of Iraq‟s Shi„i population. 
In another work, The Revealer, the Messenger, and the Message, al-Sadr argues 
against “materialistic philosophy,” but also, through his commentary on religious 
concepts of life, truth, knowledge, and degrees of being, seems to argue for the 
preeminence of Islamic laws (which appear sympathetic to natural laws) and for the need 
for revolutionary change. Consider al-Sadr‟s discussion of motion of matter and process 
of growth: “We conclude from all this that the motion of matter without provision from 
and direction by an external source could not cause real growth or evolution to a higher 
and more specialized stage...the role of matter in this process of growth is no more than 
that of suitability, readiness and potentiality.”
130
 The external source here is God, and by 
giving to Him ultimate power and the ability to create, grow, and transcend, al-Sadr in the 
process frees humanity from the dominion of man. Man owes homage only to God; he is 
free and thus no class, no group, no government has dominion over him. The implications 
here for Iraqi politics post-revolution are staggering; governments that have forsaken God 
in favor of secularism and Marxism are illegitimate. 
In his discussion of prophethood and the role Muhammad played among the 
community in Mecca, al-Sadr distinguished between the revelatory powers of 
Muhammad and the mundane societal evolution carried out by ordinary people. Under 
Muhammad, a society of tribes transformed into a universal society, a society of idols 
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embraced monotheism. “The empty society became full, even becoming a society of 
leadership bearing a culture which has illuminated the entire world.”
131
 
Conversely, al-Sadr described a revolutionary system removed from divine 
intervention, one reliant on a “preceding current of intellectual and spiritual growth 
wherein a form of able leadership is allowed to mature and assume its role.”
132
 It is 
possible that the system described by al-Sadr is one in which religious authorities did not 
invent a new political and social system (like Muhammad) but channeled and helped 
define an already present intellectual current in opposition to the status quo. 
The importance of these works, along with others penned by al-Sadr, to the 
nascent religious movement of al-Da‘wa, that gradually became politicized and then 
violently revolutionary, should not be understated. His interpretations of revelation and 
prophethood in Islam find contemporary political meanings and many of his religious 
concepts transform into “vehicles to social action.”
133
 Although his works rely on a large 
number of Shi„i sources (many more than an average Sunni theologian), they are 
remarkably universalist,
134
 which may help explain why both Shi„is and Sunnis became 
members of al-Da‘wa. 
In many ways, al-Sadr was al-Da‘wa personified. Born into a prestigious family 
of clerics claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad and a student to Sayyid Muhsin 
al-Hakim (d. 1970), the then leading marja‘ in Najaf, al-Sadr was a pure product of the 
hawza.
135
 But he, like many reform-minded junior clerics in southern Iraq, felt that only a 
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movement of radical and revolutionary change could halt the march of secularism and 
Marxism in Iraq. 
The religious career of al-Sadr along with the political movement of al-Da‘wa 
would find a much greater enemy than secularism and Marxism in Iraq only a few years 
later when, in 1968, the Ba„th party took control of the government. Fiercely secular and 
pan-Arab, the Ba„th party, especially after the ascension of Saddam Husayn to the office 
of president in 1979, would attack Islamic militancy in general and al-Da‘wa in particular 
as enemies of the state. In this new era of assassinations, secret police, and the pervasive 
threat of torture, al-Da‘wa took on a more overt political tone even as it was forced to 
retreat from sanctioned politics. 
 
Shi‘i Political Organization and Opposition In Iraq 
 Although the conflict between Shi„is and the Ba„th party between 1968 and 1980 
was unprecedented in its high levels of violence and output of propaganda, the struggle 
between Shi„is and the ruling Sunni elite in Iraq dates back to the monarchy installed by 
the British in 1921 and is in no way exclusive to the period defined by Ba„thist rule. In 
many ways, the disagreement between the two parties, which has been fought out in 
street demonstrations, armed conflict, print media, and peaceful protest for much of the 
twentieth century, is simply a disagreement about who exactly is an Iraqi. On one hand, 
Shi„is tended to champion a specifically Iraqi nationalism (sometimes called Iraqism) that 
stressed the tribal and Islamic values of Iraqi society. In a country composed 
overwhelmingly of Shi„i Muslims, such a perspective is understandable; not only does it 
embrace values that are peculiarly Iraqi but it underscores the political injustice of a 
66 
 
governmental system in which most institutions of power are controlled by the 
numerically inferior Sunnis. One the other hand, most of the ruling Sunnis in the 
relatively short history of modern Iraq have stressed Arab nationalism, the belief that 
Arabic language and Arab history and culture were the main signifiers of Iraqi national 
identity,
136
 at the expense of Iraqi nationalism, and the dream of creating a super Arab 
state that extends far beyond the territorial boundaries of Iraq. Although the conflict 
between Shi„is and Sunnis in Iraq is much more nuanced than the dichotomy presented 
above, there is no doubt that this fundamental ideological difference – Iraqism versus 
Arab nationalism – informed much of the antagonism between Sunni political rulers and 
Shi„i oppositionists in twentieth century Iraq. It has even been argued that this 
dichotomy, this inability of Iraqis to construct a viable model of political community 
explains the country‟s political and social instability.
137
 
 From the very beginning of the monarchy in Iraq, Shi„i intellectuals, religious 
leaders, and laypeople acted out against the Sunni ruling class and were vociferous in 
their disappointment in the failure of the 1920 revolt, for many Shi„is a memorable 
moment of unity among Iraqis of all confessions and ethnic backgrounds. Between April 
1927 and March 1928, the newspaper al-Nahda published thirty-two articles by the 
literary figure „Ali al-Sharqi that described what al-Sharqi saw as the success of Baghdad 
in dominating the Shi„i south and politically outmaneuvering Najaf, effectively restricting 
the shrine city from playing any meaningful role in national politics.
138
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 The collected musings of al-Sharqi, who wrote until his death in 1964, reflected 
attitudes of nationalism and feelings of disillusionment of a generation of Iraqi Shi„is 
who participated in the 1920 revolt but failed to see its potential of intra-Muslim unity 
fulfilled. Sharqi offered to his audience a vision of Iraqi nationalism alternative to that 
espoused by successive Sunni rulers, one that built on the tribal characteristics of Iraqi 
society and the historical role of Iraq‟s tribes as guarantors of Arabism. Only an authentic 
Iraqi nationalism, built on the foundation of Iraqi values and heritage, and free of foreign 
contents, could produce a legitimate government that served its people.
139
 
 How exactly did the rulers of Iraq respond to Shi„i demands of political authority 
representative of demographic realities? Although the response had several variations 
throughout the twentieth century, more often than not it centered on the governmental 
portrayal of Iraqi Shi„is as separatists, non-Arabs, and fifth columnists. However, 
propaganda, violence, and deportations reached their highest levels during the second 
Ba„th takeover of Iraq in 1968; where during much of monarchic rule in Iraq, political 
opposition and intellectual dissent had been tolerated to a decree, Ba„thists (especially 
after 1979 and the ascension of Saddam Husayn to the office of president) showed no 
such leniency. Political treatises like those written by al-Sharqi were no longer possible in 
Ba„thist Iraq; they had to be written by expatriates outside of the country. 
 One of the earliest examples of governmental attempts to marginalize the political 
opposition in southern Iraq was the Iraqi nationality law, first introduced in 1924. The 
law distinguished between Iraqis who held Ottoman citizenship before 1924 and those 
who carried Iranian citizenship, including many Shi„is who had claimed Iranian 
nationality to avoid taxation and conscription into the Ottoman army. One year earlier, in 
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1923, the government of „Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa„dun had introduced an amendment to the 
law of immigration that permitted the deportation of foreigners engaged in 
antigovernment activities. The amendment was largely a result of a conflict between the 
government and a group of Shi„i mujtahids (the majority of them Iranian subjects) who 
protested a proposed Anglo-Iraqi treaty. Yet despite laws and amendments like those 
listed above, deportation was limited in scope during the monarchy. Only in the 1960s 
and afterward, beginning with the regime of „Abd al-Salam „Arif that seized power in 
1963 and continued by the Ba„thists who succeeded him in 1968, did deportations gain 
momentum. Both the nationality law of 1963 and the provisional constitution of 1964 
severely undermined the legal status of Shi„is in Iraq. The nationality law of 1963 
referred to Iraqis who held Ottoman citizenship before 1924 as indigenous Iraqis 
(asliyyun) and stipulated that all others had to apply for Iraqi citizenship. It also awarded 
to the Minister of the Interior the authority to strip citizenship from any Iraqi found to be 
disloyal to the Iraqi republic. The 1964 constitution (specifically article 41) stated that the 
president of the republic must be born to Iraqi parents of Ottoman nationality who had 
resided in Iraq since 1900, removing from many Shi„is even the possibility of serving in 
the highest office in the Iraqi republic. When the Ba„th party ascended to power in 1968, 
its members used the nationality law (amended in 1972, 1977, and 1980) to deny 
thousands of Shi„is Iraqi nationality, citing their Iranian origins. Ba„thists deported Iraqis 
to Iran in 1963 and again in 1969-1971. As many as 300,000 Iraqis were forcibly 
removed from the country during the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war, although that 
conflict falls outside the purview of this paper.
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 The rise of the Ba„th  party coincided with the decline of communism in Iraq and 
the growth and popularity of Islamic political ideology, which soon became one of the 
party‟s biggest targets. Ba„thists began to label oppositionist Shi„is as shu‘ubi (anti-Arab) 
and their protests against government discrimination as shu‘ubiyya.
141
 Moreover, they 
portrayed Shi„i grievances as acts that promoted ta’ifiyya (sectarian divisions) in the 
state. Although Kurds and even Sunni Iraqis were sometimes labeled as sectarian 
troublemakers, it was Shi„i opponents of the Ba„th party who were most frequently 
identified as ta’ifis. For the first decade of Ba„thist rule in Iraq, the exact meaning of 
ta’ifiyya was somewhat (perhaps intentionally) vague, but following the Iranian 
revolution in 1979, it took on a clear and serious meaning: those individuals and groups 
accused of promoting sectarian difference in Iraq were those who placed their own Shi„i 




 Paranoid of neighboring Iran and troubled by the popular appeal of Islamic 
ideology after the fall of communism, the Ba„th party continued to challenge Shi„i 
political opposition, authoritative religious leaders, and the activities of al-Da‘wa, which 
gradually became more militant as the Iraqi government became more totalitarian. The 
government strategy of Ba„thist Iraq, which included deportations, interrogations, false 
imprisonments, torture, executions, and assassinations, was far worse for the Shi„i ‘ulama 
and their constituents than the secularizing strategies of the British during the monarchy 
or the leftist policies of General Qasim. Only weeks after coming to power, the 
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Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the supreme legislative and executive body of 
the Ba„th government, began periodic purges that would be a hallmark of its rule.
143
 
Internal strife, combined with international brinkmanship, finally led to open 
confrontation between the RCC and al-Da‘wa and the reengagement of ‘ulama in 
political affairs. As mentioned above, many mujtahids who had either explicitly or tacitly 
endorsed the activities of al-Da‘wa had retreated from party politics in the 1960s in order 
to salvage their religious careers, but the unprecedented threat of Ba„thism in one way or 
another drew them back into political matters. 
 The first open clash between the RCC, al-Da‘wa, and the senior religious leaders 
of the shrine cities took place in spring 1969, when the Iraqi government engaged with 
the Shah of Iran in a game of “diplomatic one-upsmanship” over the Shatt al-Arab, a 
contested waterway between both countries that would figure prominently in the eight-
year Iran-Iraq war. On April 15, the RCC sent a government message to the Iranian 
ambassador in Baghdad, notifying Iran that Iranian navy personnel were no longer 
allowed on Iranian vessels in the Shatt al-Arab. Four days later, on April 19, Iran 
announced its abrogation of the 1937 treaty that set the border on the Iranian side of the 
Shatt al-Arab
144
 and that it would no longer pay Iraqi tolls or fly the Iraqi flag on the 
waterway. Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, Iraqi president (and ranking military man in the Ba„th 
party), visited Ayatollah al-Hakim and requested he condemn the Iranian government. 
When he refused, ostensibly to protect the freedom of movement of Iranian pilgrims to 
Iraq‟s holy sites, the government arrested Iranian seminarians in Najaf, ordered the 
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closure of Kufa University and confiscated its operating and endowment funds, and 
placed strict censorship on religious publications.
145
 
 Since the creation of modern Iraq after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the 
relationship between Iraq and Iran was one of mutual distrust. Because many Iraqi Shi„is 
claimed Iranian descent and because Iran saw the shrine cities of southern Iraq as its 
“natural constituency,” many Iraqi rulers suspected Shi„is, especially those belonging to 
the clerical establishment, as being a “fifth-column of Iranian irredentism.”
146
 These 
suspicions are directly related to the 1924 and 1963 immigration laws mentioned above 
and to frequent disputes over territorial boundaries between Iraq and Iran. With the 
advent of the Ba„th party, however, such laws and disputes took on newly sinister 
dimensions; being a politically-active Shi„i in Ba„thist Iraq with vague connections to 
Iran was at best dangerous and at worst deadly. 
 Ayatollah al-Hakim intervened on behalf of the arrested seminarians, who were 
then “allowed” to leave Iraq, but some 20,000 other Shi„is were rounded up and 
summarily dropped at the Iranian border. At the beginning of June, al-Hakim led a 
precession from Najaf to Baghdad to protest the government‟s action. The government 
responded quickly and violently, arresting al-Hakim‟s son Mahdi and publicly accusing 
him of being an Israeli spy. Others critical of the government, including Sayyid Hasan 
Shirazi (d. 1980), were imprisoned, tortured, and exiled. Shaykh Abd al-Aziz al-Badri, 
who defended Mahdi at a major Sunni mosque, was arrested and killed in prison. His 
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 Later in June, a group of Shi„i scholars, including Mahdi al-Hakim, forwarded a 
letter to the government demanding the Iraqi government protect the civil rights of Shi„is, 
safeguard the holy places of Iraq, and remove restrictions on all things Islamic. The 
demands, which speak loudly about the priorities of the mujtahids and their willingness to 
challenge the prerogatives of the Iraqi government even in a period of mass deportations, 
arrests, and torture, are worth including at length; the letter demanded, among other 
things, that 1) “the censorship which has been imposed under the state laws on Islamic 
publications, for the suppression of Islamic ideals, should be withdrawn at once,” 2) 
“…permission should be given to start a daily newspaper which should uphold the 
Islamic view of life and expression of Islamic belief,” and 3) “…there should be no 
confiscation of property, no false accusations of espionage, and no leveling of false 
charges on the basis of difference of political views.”
148
 
 The RCC responded to requests like those of Mahdi al-Hakim and to other acts of 
civil disobedience with escalating pressure during the remainder of 1969 and throughout 
the 1970s. The seminaries of southern Iraq, indeed the entire hawza was systematically 
assaulted, its leaders exiled, arrested, tortured, and killed. Those who escaped execution 
were more often than not exiled to neighboring countries: Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Kuwait, 
and the United Arab Emirates.
149
 
 The Rubicon was crossed in July 1979, when Saddam Husayn (then President), 
purged the upper ranks of the Ba„th party, executing twenty-one senior Ba„thists. Ex-
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president Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, who had recruited al-Hakim ten years earlier to publicly 
denounce Iran, died soon thereafter under mysterious conditions in his home. All the 
power that had previously been invested in the RCC transferred to the office of the 
president and the hands of Saddam Husayn. This transfer of power, in combination with 
the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran, empowered the leaders of al-Da‘wa and the 
Islamic movement in Iraq to give up mass demonstrations and civil disobedience in favor 
of non-peaceful means of protest. Ayatollah al-Sadr, who succeeded Ayatollah al-Hakim 
after his death in 1970, wrote for Sawt al-Da‘wa:  
In the present situation, Islam needs not reform, but revolution…The 
schools and their curricula, the newspapers and the magazines with their 
aims, and the radio stations, are all tools in the hands of the authorities. 
The only way to change the propaganda is to change the rulers. So our 





This passage speaks loudly about the condition of Iraqi politics in the late 1970s. 
Clearly al-Sadr, and probably many of those who looked toward him for spiritual 
and political guidance, felt that Ba„thism had so thoroughly infiltrated every level 
of governmental and non-governmental authority and every means of 
communication that the only way to unseat Ba„thists from power, reassert the 
supremacy of Islam, and save Iraq from despotism was violent revolution. 
On July 31, 1979 the newly formed Islamic Liberation Movement (ILM), 
a coalition of the main Iraqi Islamic parties, issued a statement pledging support 
for al-Sadr, who had recently been placed under house arrest, and announcing 
they were taking up violent methods in response to government violence against 
them. The press release includes information on 10,000 detainees held by Ba„thist 
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security forces, 36 who had died under torture, and another 100 sentenced to 
death. It announces that the Ba„thist regime is facing a “triple enemy”: the Islamic 
revolution, the Kurdish revolution, and the communists. The aims of the ILM, 
according to the press release, include: exposing the fallacy of the Ba„thists; 
winning the support of other movements in and outside of Iraq; and isolating the 
Ba„thist regime from its ability to “control and brainwash.”
151
 
 With the adoption of military tactics, many of the Islamic groups, 
including al-Da‘wa
152
 split into civilian wings, which continued to non-violently 
spread the message of Islam, and military wings, which planned and executed 
guerrilla attacks against government targets and security forces. Throughout the 
summer, fall, and winter of 1979-1980 guerrilla attacks continued against low-
level and high-level targets: a mujahid (fighter) member of al-Da‘wa in August 
1979 attempted to assassinate as high-profile a target as Saddam Husayn at 
Karama Hospital in Baghdad; and in November, during Ashura, a Shi„i opened 
fire on security forces, killing four. After these episodes and others like them, the 
government expanded the number of its security forces and began arresting more 
and more Islamic activists.
153
 
The violent crackdown initiated by Saddam Husayn against organized Shi„i 
opposition was not simply a result of internal strife between the regime and members and 
sympathizers of al-Da‘wa. The creation of the Islamic Republic in Iran in February 1979 
appeared to influence many of the political actions taken by Husayn in the next few 
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years, including his decision to wage war against Iran. Fearful that the nearby Iranian 
revolution might “overwhelm” Iraqi Shi„is (already portrayed sometimes as fifth-
columnists and irredentists) and agitated by protests in Shi„i areas immediately after the 
revolution, Husayn moved to halt any momentum by arresting al-Sadr, the spiritual leader 
of Iraqi Shi„ism. There is evidence, also, that the leadership crisis that ended in Husayn 
taking full control of the regime and al-Bakr placed under house arrest, was at least 
partially inspired by the Shi„i controversy. Members of the RCC were split over the 
treatment of the Shi„is.
154
 
In March 1980, the progress made by Islamic groups came to a dead stop. Ninety-
six members of al-Da‘wa were reportedly executed that month and on March 31, RCC 
Resolution 461 retroactively made membership in al-Da‘wa a capital offense.
155
 Less 
than two weeks later, on April 8, Ayatollah al-Sadr, the spiritual leader of the Islamic 
resistance in Iraq, along with his sister Bint al-Huda were executed, allegedly in a 
particularly gruesome way. The al-Hakim family was also targeted, with dozens of its 
members arrested and assassinated. Religious leadership in Najaf thus fell upon quietist 
Abu al-Qasem al-Kho„i who quickly retreated from politics.
156
 The immediate outcome 
of these events was an alarming escalation of violence between the Ba„th and Islamic 
oppositionists, particularly members of al-Da‘wa. The government was systematic and 
brutal in its repression and destruction of the Islamic movement, destroying the ranks of 
al-Da‘wa. Consequently, and especially after the outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran, 
                                                          
154
 See Ofra Bengio, “Shi„is and Politics in Ba„thi Iraq” in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1985): 
7. According to one source, President al-Bakr refused to ratify an execution order with the names of senior 
officers accused, by Husayn, of maintaining secret contacts with rebel Shi„is. When he refused, he was 




 Louër, Shia Politics, 88. 
76 
 






The events of early 1980 clearly end the first stage of modern Islamic resistance, 
armed or otherwise, to government activities inimical to Islam. Islamic movements had 
survived the monarchy, military rule, and the short-lived zenith of communist power, in 
large part because during those periods in modern Iraq the governments in charge 
allowed some degree of political participation, civil disobedience, and oppositionist 
journals, newspapers, and demonstrations. The Ba„th party, however, especially after the 
ascension of Saddam Husayn to president, combined ideologies unwelcome to Islamists – 
secularism, pan-Arabism, violence and propaganda against Iran – with tactics – constant 
surveillance, deportations, arrests, torture, executions, assassinations – that made 
opposition politics almost impossible. That al-Da‘wa and like-minded organizations 
survived above-ground until 1980 is almost miraculous considering the dire 
consequences of political opposition in Iraq. However, in 1980, with the spiritual 
leadership of the movement destroyed, increased hostility toward Islamic activists, and a 
law on the books outlawing public participation in al-Da‘wa, Islamic activists were either 
forced to clandestinely leave Iraq or to go underground. 
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Iraqi Communist Opposition 
 
The published history of modern Iraq has long been dominated by nationalist and 
pan-Arab narratives, by the interaction between European imperialism and Iraqi self-
determination, and, most recently, by the destabilization caused by American military 
expeditions. Obscured by these monumental narratives are the religious, ethnic, and 
social groups and organizations that struggled for power beginning with the British 
mandate, some of which continue to seek influence in the new post-war Iraq: Islamic 
revivalists, Kurdish nationalists, tribal chiefs, women, and the Iraqi Communist Party 
(ICP), around which this chapter is based.  
History is written by the winners, but it is also written on behalf of the winners. In 
the long history of modern Iraq the ICP was the perennial loser, but also represented an 
important party of opposition, perhaps the party of opposition in Iraq after the end of 
World War II. They were the loudest and most critical voice vis-à-vis the British 
presence in Iraq and briefly won large popular and governmental support
158
 despite their 
incapacity to compete with the visceral and emotional appeal of pan-Arabism and 
Islamism. Despite brief episodes of success, members and suspected sympathizers of the 
ICP were routinely subjects of discrimination, imprisonment, execution, and general 
political paranoia. To understand the ICP is to make sense of what Orit Bashkin calls the 
“other Iraq”: workers‟ movements, oppositional media, indeed all leftist political 
associations who embraced neither pan-Arabism nor Islamic revivalism but chose instead 
a politically viable third way. Although many of these movements and publications 
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existed beneath ground, despite their illegality, and otherwise in secret during the 
monarchy and even during periods between 1958 and 1968, they endured and represented 
a significant, sometimes widespread, ideological resistance to the political status quo in 
Iraq. Only under Ba„thism – which, ironically, allowed communism as an ideology to 
operate in a public sphere – did the ICP and the organizations, groups, and unions it 
represented lose their viability as independent sources of political opposition. By 1980, 
like the membership of al- Da„wa, the ranks of the ICP, which had swelled in number 
after the 1958 revolution to such an extreme degree that in January 1959 the party refused 
to accept new members,
159
 were systematically destroyed or forced underground. 
Ideological opposition to the state could not be tolerated under Ba„thism as it had been, in 
fits and starts, during the monarchy and the early republic. Yet it was not only Party 
policy that prevented the ICP from functioning in Iraq under Saddam Husayn; the 
rhetorical minefield he had created forestalled all opposition movements. When the Iraqi 
state became vessel for the Party, and the Party guarantor of the Revolution, opposition to 
the Party could only exist within a treasonous, felonious context. 
 
The Martyr’s Party 
The ICP is sometimes called the “martyr‟s party” because of the high number of 
communist members killed by regimes that have controlled Iraq from its modern-day 
inception.
160
 The most famous and public of the many executions of high-ranking Iraqi 
communists occurred in February 1949 when general secretary Yusuf Salman Yusuf 
(Comrade Fahd) and two members of the politburo were hanged publicly in Baghdad; 
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their bodies were left hanging for several hours after the execution so that other Iraqis 
might take notice. Husayn al-Radi, who became general secretary in 1955, was captured 
and tortured following the first Ba„thist coup and died in 1963. 
As the abovementioned episodes indicate, the ICP throughout its existence has 
more often than not relied on clandestine activities. For much of the twentieth century the 
party operated illegally with two notable exceptions: the five year period between the 
1958 revolution and the 1963 Ba‟thist coup and for five years between 1973 and 1978 
when Saddam Husayn undertook a campaign of repression against members of the ICP. 
The membership and tactics employed by the communist party in Iraq were heavily 
affected by these waves of repression: Iraqi communists could publish newspapers, 
organize workers‟ movements openly, and recruit new members much more freely during 
moments of relative freedom; each of these moments, however, were followed by phases 
of censorship, persecution, and imprisonment. Still, the fact that for long periods of time 
the ICP acted secretly as a small, disenfranchised organization is somewhat misleading; 
its leadership role among workers, from Mosul to Basra, was virtually unparalleled across 
the Arab Middle East and, despite fluctuations in membership and popular appeal, the 
ICP stood at the center of what has been described as the “other Iraq” or in the words of 
Eric Davis, “politics of the street.”
161
 
 Although Davis in his Memories of State mostly catalogues the Ba‟thist project of 
rewriting history and redefining Iraqi cultural heritage, he includes a thought-provoking 
analysis of the distribution of political power in interwar Iraq. Although political and 
military power belonged to the Hashemite monarchy and the Iraqi army, a growing 
community of educated middle-class Iraqis began to form the base of a politically-aware 
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civil society in Iraq. The 1930s especially witnessed the growth of urban centers and the 
political mobilization of a growing middle and working class who, despite being largely 
excluded from the central government, formed a source of political and intellectual power 
that ran parallel to the state machinery in the interwar years. The Iraqi Communist Party, 
formed in 1934 from three different socialist groups, became the first truly ideological 
and mass-based political party in Iraq.
162
 
 No study of the ICP and its relationship with workers‟ movements and the status 
quo in Iraq could be complete without reference to Hanna Batatu‟s magnum opus The 
Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq which, along with a 
sweeping economic history of Iraq, focuses on the ICP and how it led the national 
movement in the 1940s and 1950s. Batatu recapitulates the events of al-wathba, a mass 
urban movement of protest against the Portsmouth Agreement in particular and British 
interventionism in general during which communists “emerged unmistakably as the 
fundamental force.”
163
 Batatu also argues that the popular appeal of communist and 
socialist ideas in Iraq, which reached all-time highs in 1948, 1959 and the mid-1970s, 
illuminates the social conditions prevailing in the county. In his examination of the years 
between 1945 and 1950, Batatu includes several tables showing the relationship of 
popular disturbances to drops in wages. 
 The picture of the ICP painted by modern historians, including but not limited to 
Batatu, is one where ideas of nationalism and questions about social inequality merged in 
a unique way often in an illegal public sphere since, for most of its history, communists 
were barred from organizing legally. In the years following the termination of World War 
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II, communism became more popular and generated new cells among students, workers, 
civil servants and the military. Meeting in cafes, members‟ houses, and the streets to 
avoid detection, communists discussed the pro-Western Hashemite monarchy and harsh 
postwar economic conditions. The ICP formed student organizations and women‟s 
groups, published newspapers and organized strikes against oil companies and on behalf 
of railway workers. While ICP members pushed for democratic freedoms, such as 
freedom of expression and the right to form political parties and trade unions, and 
workplace rights, including fair wages and vacation days, they strongly criticized the pro-
colonialist ruling elite which monopolized the political institutions and economic 
infrastructure of Iraq. Lack of true democratic reform and economic stagnation was often 
treated as the symptom of the policies of ruling elites who unacceptably denied basic 
human rights and allowed British army bases in Iraq.
164
 
 The communist movement in Iraq, much like those in Western Europe, Russia 
and Latin America, can be explained not only by historical research but by theoretical 
models, especially those articulated by Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci whose ideas 
about intellectuals, hegemony, and counter-hegemony resonate with the ICP struggle 
against the ruling elite in Iraq. In the Gramscian vocabulary “hegemony” describes the 
cultural domination exercised by the ruling class, distinct from legislative, political or 
coercive force. Ruling intellectuals create a cultural environment which explains and 
perpetuates the status quo while propagating the idea that subordinate classes must 
inevitably submit to those in power; in other words, the masses are socialized to believe 
that their subservience is natural and unchangeable and therefore cannot and should not 
be questioned. Opposed to this idea of hegemony is Gramsci‟s understanding of 
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“counter-hegemony,” a revolutionary ideology introduced by intellectuals of the 
subordinate classes meant ultimately to replace capitalist systems with democratic 
socialism. Like the hegemonic vision of ruling intellectuals, the counter-hegemonic 
vision in nonviolent; universal revolution is achieved through cultural subversion.
165
 
 Ideas introduced by Gramsci are particularly provocative when applied to 1959 
when the Iraqi Communist Party considered, and eventually decided against, taking 
power in Iraq. Gramsci argued that the politico-historical reality was that a class is 
dominant in two ways: it is “leading” and it is “dominant.” It leads the allied classes and 
dominates the opposing classes. A class must “lead” before taking power.
166
 Certainly the 
ICP during and immediately after the 1958 revolution represented a “leading” class; it 
had widespread popular support and in many ways embodied the revolutionary spirit. 
 The political and social legacies of the ICP might best described as “vanguard 
activism” which helped establish a model in Iraq for modern political parties. Through 
mobilization efforts, newspapers and clandestine party literature, Iraqi communists 
identified and pursued solutions to public concerns and inequalities. Even the structure of 
the ICP, composed mostly of semi-independent underground cells, provided a model 
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Membership and Recruitment 
 Apart from clandestine cells created among workers, high school students, college 
students, public servants, and the armed forces, the ICP tried, mostly unsuccessfully, to 
mobilize in legal venues. Political parties were created (but rarely licensed), journals and 
newspapers were published, and strikes organized among workers. The strike on 
Kirkuk‟s oil company was the biggest, with 5,000 strikers out of work in July 1946.  
Communist activist and writer „Aziz al-Haj, whose political career is examined later in 




After World War II, high-ranking members of the ICP also looked north toward 
the Kurdish-dominated areas of Iraq as part of a larger project to recruit minority groups. 
Comrade Fahd suggested that the ICP be more inclusive of minority linguistic and ethnic 
groups and therefore special attention was paid Kurds, Turkomans, and Armenians. It 
was imagined by Fahd that each ethnic group would create its own branch of the ICP, 




 Fahd insisted that Kurdish political autonomy would not be achieved through 
British intervention but through an Arab-Kurdish alliance that would solve the problems 
facing both communities and achieve political independence. There is evidence, 
statistical and anecdotal, that suggests Fahd‟s recruitment in Kurdistan was successful: 
according to communist activist Baha‟ al-Din Nuri, Kurdish was the language that 
allowed him to enter communist politics (he read about Soviet victories in World War II 
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in Kurdish publications). In the 1940s a small number of Kurds, most famously „Aziz al-




Communism under the Ruler Regimes, 1958-1968 
 The 1958 revolution was almost universally applauded by the Iraqi population. 
For many social groups and political parties it signaled not only the end of British 
involvement in Iraq but also the ascension of a government that would pursue policies 
toward their goals. Particularly enthusiastic and optimistic about the future were members 
and supporters of the ICP, who were able to come out into the open for the first time after 
the revolution. The ICP was suddenly thrust into a position of great political power 
following the revolution because 1) the Free Officers who staged the takeover of 
government had, as of 1958, been unable to create a significant support base within the 
armed forces and thus the power struggle in the months that followed the revolution 
involved gaining mass support; 2) political opposition parties were outlawed before the 
revolution and even those parties that were allowed, however briefly, to function (like the 
NDP and Istiqlal) were never allowed to expand their popular support base and thus 3) 
the real source of political oppositional power remained underground with the ICP which 
controlled most of the mass organizations and trade unions.
171
 
 Therefore, and although his personal political views were more aligned to the 
NDP, Qasim forged an uneasy alliance with the ICP; he depended, after all, on mass 
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support during a time when the masses were demonstrably sympathetic to the goals of 
communism at the expense of rival ideologies.
172
 
 The peak of communist influence in Iraqi politics lasted approximately one year. 
Support for communism was most widespread in early 1959: ICP members had been 
elected to the majority of seats on the governing bodies of many of the leading 
professional associations; trade unions had been legalized; and the party had made 
inroads into the military. Even though Qasim never allowed ICP members of supporters 
to hold position of power in the government or civil service, it was widely believed (or 




 Despite this widespread belief in impending communist political domination, the 
party began to lose power shortly after the massacre at Kirkuk in July 1959 (the 
communists were blamed) and an attempt on Qasim‟s life in October 1959. After these 
events, Qasim began to repair relations with nationalists, many of whom were reinstated 
in the armed forces and civil bureaucracy, and cut ties with the communists. When, in 
January 1960, Qasim announced political parties would be legalized, it was a factious 
communist party, without organization or members, which was legalized instead of the 
authentic party. From that point until 1963, the ICP fought a never-ending rearguard 




 The ICP experienced one of its lowest points during 1963, after Qasim was 
deposed and summarily shot in February. An uncomfortable and short alliance between 
                                                          
172
 Ibid., 55. 
173
 Ibid., 66. 
174
 Ibid,, 70-74. 
86 
 
Ba„thists and non-Ba„thists ruled for several months and although serious disagreements 
emerged between and among factions, all groups agreed on the need to eliminate Qasim‟s 
former support base. Thus a savage campaign of arrests, torture, and execution was 
directed mainly toward the ICP and its supporters. The campaign was harshest in the 
early weeks following the coup but continued unabated for much of 1963, claiming 3,000 
lives. Most active in this campaign was the Ba„thist National Guard, issued with weapons 
during the coup and accountable only to the leadership of the Ba„th Party.
175
 
 After the fall of the Ba„th in November, persecution against communists 
diminished and many members who had fled the country returned. Relations between 
members of the Central Committee and the regime also improved; the ICP leadership 
decided in August 1964 that it should support the “progressive Nasserist elements” within 
the Salam „Arif government. For many junior members and sympathizers, however, the 
„Arif regime was indistinguishable from the Ba„th and in any event equally responsible 
for the massacre of communists. By April 1965, the leadership of the ICP had adopted a 
position more in line with its grassroots members, although this militant line often 
became a subject for serious disagreement and, eventually, a significant split within the 
party.
176
 In a communiqué from the communist party conference that decided in mid-
April to adopt some form of decisive action, Zaki Khairi declared, “in the future, party 
functionaries and rank and file [members] will have a bigger say in determining the 
attitude of the Party and in formulating its policy.”
177
 It also called, for the first time, for 
“the overthrow of the dictatorial military regime…and for a provisional government of a 
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national coalition…for democratic freedoms, for a democratic settlement of the Kurdish 
question and for reinvigorating the county.”
178
 The communiqué similarly criticized the 
government for its executions of leftists and communists:  
Several thousand communists and democrats languish in jail. Power is 
concentrated in the hands of the military junta, which has deprived the 
patriotic forces of any legitimacy and freedoms. The present rate of the 





Several important elements of the ICP and of Iraqi politics in general are presented in this 
communiqué: first, it was written by Zaki Khairi, a former party liaison with the army in 
the 1930s,
180
 and shows the ambivalence of the ICP toward the army, which was 
characterized by the leadership of the ICP as boasting revolutionary elements, but 
rejected as a reliable instrument of revolutionary change;
181
 it presents the communist 
party as keenly interested, or at least publicly aware of, the Kurdish situation in northern 
Iraq; and it demonstrates once again that communists and other “democrats” suffered 
mightily before Husayn‟s rise to power. The 1960s were years of constant upheaval and 
violence for all Iraqi leftists, indeed for all Iraqi oppositionists. 
 
The ICP and the Ba‘th 
It is difficult to comprehend the relationship between the Iraqi Communist Party 
and the Ba„thist regime without understanding the political career of „Aziz al-Haj who, 
until his public recantation in 1969, was a symbol for the extreme left of Iraqi 
communism. A Shi„i Kurd, al-Haj joined the ICP in the early 1940s, became a fulltime 
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181
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militant, and quickly acquired national fame as an intellectual, publicist, and editor of the 
communist publication Al-Qa‘ida. He was arrested in 1948 and sentenced to twenty years 
imprisonment. His statements to the investigating magistrate at the time were extremely 
candid and sometimes arrogant: he proudly admitted his involvement with the ICP, the 
only movement that cared about “the pains and aspirations of working people and the 
liberated intelligentsia.”
182
 Moreover, in statement that bitterly contrasts with his later 
recantation and the subsequent deaths of his former comrades at the hands of the Ba„th, 
al-Haj reproached the security officials for their strong-arm methods and their use of 
torture. Al-Haj spent the next ten years in a maximum security prison, but emerged in 
1958 following the coup that overthrew the monarchy.
183
 
Upon his release, al-Haj was elected to the Central Committee and five years 
later, in 1963, he organized resistance to the first Ba„th regime from Prague, where he 
had been sent in 1959 as ICP representative to the World Marxist Review.
184
 Following 
his return to Iraq, he became the focus of growing disaffection with the ICP leadership. 
By September 1969, two organizations emerged out of the ICP: al-Haj‟s Central 
Command and the pro-Soviet Central Committee.
185
 
 The Central Command quickly asserted its independence from the from the 
International Communist movement
186
 and took up an increasingly hostile line vis-à-vis 
Iraqi politics: it called for, among other things, “the arming of the masses,” “organized 
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revolutionary violence,” and “popular armed struggle in the towns and countryside” with 
its ultimate goal the establishment of “a revolutionary popular democratic regime under 
the leadership of the working class.”
187
 
 After the 1968 coup, the Ba„th offered both factions spots in the new cabinet. The 
Central Command refused the offer and soon after an “underground war”
188
 between 
followers of al-Haj and regime forces broke out in Iraq.  November 1968 was particularly 
violent. On November 5, two communists were killed and others wounded when 950 
workers staging a strike at Baghdad‟s vegetable oil factory were fired upon. Two days 
later, three other communists died when a rally celebrating the fifty-first anniversary of 
the Bolshevik revolution was attacked. Members of the Central Command retaliated by 
forming small armed detachments and, in January 1969, ordered them to attack regime 
targets. Detachments raided the offices of the governor of Sulaimaniyya, exploded 
official vehicles, and even fired upon the house of Saddam Husayn.
189
 
 The escalation of violence culminated in the capture of al-Haj along with other 
members of the politburo and unknown numbers of rank-and-file members, all of whom 
were subjected to the violence of Nadhim Kzar‟s security forces. Two members of the 
five-man politburo held out and died under torture; the remaining three, including al-Haj, 
broke down under torture and were made to recant their affiliation with communism and 
admit their crimes against the “revolution” on television.
190
 In his public statement, he 
compared himself to “a bull charging a concrete wall to break it, but could not make an 
impression on it.” It was reported that he told the authorities following his arrest, “I can 
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no longer bear torture, I will co-operate.”
191
 As a result of his recantation and retirement 
from communist organization, al-Haj was granted a diplomatic post as Iraqi 
representative to UNESCO in Paris.
192
 
 While the Central Command was being hunted down, the Central Committee 
reached something of a truce with the Ba„th Party. On July 10, 1970, the regime 
announced a series of conditions, the acceptance of which would entitle the Central 
Committee to join a “Progressive National Front.” These conditions included: recognition 
of the Ba„th Party “as a revolutionary, unionist, socialist and democratic party; a 
statement of the historically progressive nature of the July 1968 “revolution”; recognition 
of the commanding role of the Ba„th in the government, mass organizations, and the 
National Front; the restriction of political activity within the armed forces to the Ba„th; 
and adherence to Arab unity.
193
 
 In their reply, the Central Committee doubted the usefulness of the method of 
setting terms before actual negotiations took place. They were similarly dubious about 
many of the Ba„thist prerequisites, including recognition of the commanding role of the 
Ba„th (something that should be left to the conscious choice of the masses) and the 
impermissibility of special loyalties in the army.
194
 
 Over the next twelve months, relations between the ICP and the regime worsened. 
In the winter of 1970-1971, regime forces conducted widespread arrests of party 
members in the southern provinces. In January it was discovered that Kadhim al-Jasim, a 
prominent member of the mid-Euphrates Branch Committee, and Aziz Hamid, a 
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professional party worker, had died under torture in a Baghdad prison. In September 
came news that Central Committee member Shaykh „Ali al-Barzanchi died in the torture 
chamber of the Nihayah Palace.
195
 
 In April 1972, however, the regime announced a fifteen-year Iraqi-Soviet 
friendship treaty. The announcement was hailed by Central Committee members as the 
realization of “one of the great aims” of the revolution and by the end of the month two 
Central Committee members entered government, for the first time. In July 1973, the 
National Action Charter was signed by President al-Bakr and „Aziz Muhammad in his 
capacity as first secretary of the ICP Central Committee. All conditions established by the 
Ba„th in its July 1970 invitation were accepted by the ICP, which subsequently became a 




 In an internal memo in late July 1973, the Central Committee laid out the reasons 
for its participation in the Front: 
Our Party based its evaluation…on the fact that the proposed draft Charter 
was anti-imperialist, and underlined the importance of perseverance in 
bolstering cooperative relations with socialist states. Also, it declared total 
and unequivocal alignment with the camp of peoples fighting against 
imperialism….In addition, the draft Charter included a number of 
significant conclusions, which stressed the importance of joint action and 




In other words, the communists would support (and validate) the regime if it committed 
itself to an anti-imperialist and progressive agenda. But why, after five years of resisting 
a formal alliance with the regime, did the leadership of the ICP plunge itself so 
completely into the Front which, in hindsight and probably at the moment, signaled 
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political suicide? „Aziz Muhammad and other ranking members of the Central 
Committee were, after all, not very different from al-Haj, who had, only a few years 
earlier, taken up an uncompromising approach to the regime. Muhammad had also spent 
a decade (1948-1958) in prison and had seen some of his closest colleagues murdered by 
Ba„thist militia forces in 1963. Perhaps the Charter (or the idea of the Charter) was too 
important for senior communists to ignore, despite their reservations about Ba„thist 
intentions; or, perhaps, a “seemingly inexorable political logic”
198
 had set in the minds of 
the Central Committee leadership, one where the inevitable political and physical 
destruction of communism in Iraq became a reality. 
After the signing of the National Action Charter and the official licensing of the 
ICP, Iraqi Communists began to conduct their business in the open. Communist leaders 
attended official function as representatives of their party and not solely in a personal 
capacity. Conversely, non-communist dignitaries attended special ICP events.
199
 
 For a short time after the creation of the National Front, the party affiliations of 
the communists were tolerated. In fact, a strange kind of political hybridity existed within 
the Front. In a speech given at a meeting of the Iraqi General Federation of Trade unions 
on February 25, 1976, Husayn said: 
It is our opinion that all Iraqis, even those belonging to other political 
parties, should not feel that there is a contradiction in their belonging to 
other political parties and at the same time regarding the ABSP as their 
own party. This is because the ABSP is leading society and the Revolution 
and because it has proved to them that it is qualified to be their own party 
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The primacy of Ba„thism is clearly demonstrated in this passage and, with the benefit of 
hindsight, so too is the political frailty of Iraqi communists. The idea of dual loyalty 
under Ba„thism is something of an impossibility: the Ba„th Party is the leader of the 
“Revolution” and the “realization of the future”; all other parties are relics of an ancient 
past. 
 With the establishment of the Front and the support of the Central Committee, the 
regime launched its 1974 war against the Kurds. Kurdish defeat in 1975 allowed the 
regime to renew its hostilities toward the ICP. Accusations against individual communists 
began late in 1976. The charge was political activism inside the armed forces, a clear 
breach of the conditions of the Charter. Arrests and executions followed
201
 and by 1979 
what was left of the ICP Central Committee was in prison or in exile.
202
  
 In 1976, Husayn delivered a speech to a large meeting of the National Front, in 
which he admonished communists for their lack of loyalty toward the Front. 
According to our information some brothers, especially from the 
Communist Party, still feel embarrassed when asked: “Are you with the 
regime or not? Are you with the Revolution or not?” The Revolution is 
cherished by every honest patriot and its major achievements are obvious 
to all…Supposing we Ba„thists reversed the case and started attacking the 




In reality such attacks were not far off. Yet even before the regime went on an 
offensive against Iraqi communists, and demonstrated by this speech, Husayn 
used rhetorical devices to distinguish loyal children of the “Revolution” and 
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“honest patriot[s]” with communists whose psychology was unprepared or 
unwilling to accept an equal partnership with a regime that represented the 
Revolution and spoke for the people. Speeches such as the one quoted above also 
served to exacerbate and reify fears and doubts about the Front and the loyalty of 
its communist members. In many ways, this speech justified a preemptive strike 
against the communists, whose disloyalty threatened the entire revolutionary 
experiment. 
When asked about the breakdown of the National Front, ICP Secretary General 
Aziz Muhammad insisted it resulted from the fact that the Ba„th engaged in a “wholesale 
retreat” from their agreed upon positions, including everything from internal socio-
economic issues to Arab, and international, issues. The main factors, Muhammad argued, 
were the Ba„thist renunciation of the alliance with the ICP, and renewed oppression in 
Kurdistan. When asked about the actual termination date of the Front, Muhammad chose 
May 4, 1979 after which communist party offices were closed: “The party is now more 





The ICP by 1980 was not the party of vanguard activism described by Ismael; it 
could be argued the communists in Iraq never truly recovered from the 1963 Ba„thist 
purge.
205
 Its historical role, however, should not be underestimated by students of modern 
Iraq. For much of the twentieth century the ICP was the only voice which spoke on 
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behalf of the disenfranchised and which established, through organizational activities, 
strikes, protests, newspapers and mass mobilization, a counter-hegemonic vision of Iraq.   
Although the ICP‟s admission to the National Front and its subsequent physical 
destruction by the Ba„th regime signaled the last gasp of Iraqi communism on a national 
stage, the party suffered greatly at the hands of regimes beginning as early as the 1930s. 
Embracing a rival political ideology – Iraqi nationalism – and public in its anti-regime 
demonstrations, publications, and attitudes, the ICP was a target for regime forces, 
whether Hashemite, republican, or Ba„thist. The number of executions of leftists and 
communists in a single year under the „Arif regime exceeded the total number executed 
during the entire monarchical period.
206
 Yet the extreme violence and rhetorical 
categories employed by the Ba„th created a unique political situation in Iraq whereby 
opposition parties were branded not simply as anti-regime but as treacherous and 
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 For many politically-active Iraqis not swallowed up by the Ba„th apparatus, 1980 
represented the last gasp of opposition politics and civil society. Even before Iraq 
plunged itself into a disastrous and bloody eight-year war with its neighbor Iran, the most 
potent opposition groups had been all but annihilated. The spiritual leadership of al-
Da‘wa, the organization most capable of guaranteeing Shi„i rights, was destroyed and its 
members outlawed; the Iraqi Communist Party was crushed and its leadership executed, 
exiled, or driven underground; and the Kurds had been decisively defeated on the 
battlefields of northern Iraq, and their leadership splintered. Moreover, in their absence 
no new opposition movements or politically-active organizations could emerge. 
Surveillance equipment and members of the secret police towered (physically and in 
Iraqis‟ imaginations) over a civic sphere that had been building slowly in Iraq after 
independence. 
 Saddam Husayn, whose vision of Ba„thism was particularly violent, parochial, 
and paranoid, combined a legacy of institutional weakness in Iraqi society with his own 
brand of political logic and authoritarianism. In the process, the progress made by 
alternative sources of political power was retarded and eventually reversed. Influential 
parties of opposition were co-opted, manipulated, and decimated; the army was purged of 
non-Ba„thists and reorganized to prevent future coups; the bureaucracy was staffed with 
Party loyalists; the religious seminaries of southern Iraq were targets of xenophobia and 
oppression; Shi„is of all political affiliations were treated as fifth columnists; and the 
Kurds were exiled, resettled, and, in many instances, massacred. 
97 
 
 Neither monarchical Iraq (1932-1958) nor republican Iraq (1958-1968) was 
especially forgiving to political opposition. Ethnic and political minorities were usually 
awarded only token posts on government, and more often than not opposition parties, 
newspapers, and journals were shut down and made illegal. Yet opposition was accepted 
to a degree. The same cannot be said for Ba„thism, which gradually turned Iraq into a 
police state. Opposition to the regime was not tolerated, nor was loyalty to a system or 
party unaffiliated with Ba„thism.  The Party‟s most alarming accomplishment, however, 
was its complete absorption of the government, then the state, and then the people. Rarely 
does a political party recreate an entire country in its own image, but that is precisely 
what Ba„thism and Saddam Husayn did. 
 Above all, this paper argued that neither determinism nor individualism can 
completely explain the emergence of Ba„thism as the hegemonic power in Iraq after 1968 
or its criminal and ideological behavior after its ascent to power. Saddam Husayn 
emerged from a political power structure in Iraq based on patrimonialism and cooptation, 
and from a relatively weak and young civil society, and thus inherited a political legacy 
as old as the Iraqi state. Yet he was not simply a sequel to King Faisal or General Qasim. 
Under Husayn, the rules of the game changed in meaningful ways for parties of political 
opposition and for everyday Iraqis. There was certain single-mindedness, brutality, and 
political paranoia embodied in Husayn that made him unique, even as he wielded well-
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